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WTO REFORM: MULTILATERAL CONTROL OVER UNILATERAL
RETALIATION - LESSONS FROM THE US-CHINA TRADE WAR
JULIA YA QIN*
Preventing trade xars is a key function of the World Trade
Organizaton (W'TO) rule-based system. But as the United
States (US) and China waged the largest trade war in history, the
W'TO sat on the side-knes, unable to do anything to stop the fight.
Why has the system failed so spectacularly? In a search for
answers, this article examines the context of the US-China confkct
and makes a number of findings. First, under W'TO lay), the
burden of avoiding this trade wvar was placed on China, the victim
of US aggressive unilateral tarJifs; and contray to China's claim,
its retaliatory taiffs cannot be justified by general principles of
international ay). Second, the W'TO rule prohibiting unilateral
retahation xas born out of a grand poktical bargain, but it
embodies the xisdom of Adam Smith and achieves the goal of the
Havana Charter to turn retahation into an instrument of
international order. Third, the W"TO's inabilkty to prevent
China's resort to unilateral retaliation reveals a deficiency in its
existing legal design, but that deficiency can be fixed procedurally
as proposed herein. Given the importance ofpreventng large-scale
trade wars in the future, improving multilateral control over
unilateral retaliation should be a top priority in W"TO reform.
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There is a broad consensus that the WTO is in need of reform. The reform agenda,
however, needs to include one item that has been so far overlooked: how to
improve the trading system so as to prevent trade wars,' like the one being waged
between the US and China since 2018.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University, U.S.A. E-mail: ya.qin[at]wayne.edu. I would
like to thank Sungjoon Cho, Lothar Ehring, Milan Hejtmanek, Bruce Hirsh, Simon Lester,
Thomas Schoenbaum and Ruosi Zhang for their comments on previous drafts of the
article. I am especially grateful to Lothar Ehring whose insightful remarks at the 2019
BIICL WTO Conference sowed the seed for this article and to the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law for organising that stimulating conference. The
research for this article is current as of October 31, 2020.
1 'Trade war' is not a legally defined term. In this article, a trade war refers to a situation in
which countries raise trade barriers against each other's products, typically in the form of
tariff or non-tariff restrictions on imports.
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The ongoing US-China conflict encompasses the largest trade war in history. Even
after the two countries called a truce with their phase-one deal in January 2020,
tariffs mutually imposed remain escalated and extensive, affecting most products in
the US-China bilateral trade. More seriously, the tariff war has extended to the
fields of technology, science, education, finance, and beyond. The geopolitical
tension created by the trade war has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic,
causing bilateral relations to deteriorate to their lowest level in decades and pushing
the world to the brink of a new Cold War.
Since the spring of 2018, the Trump administration has launched several trade
wars by imposing or threatening extra import tariffs on steel, aluminium,
automobiles, and auto parts, from most of its trading partners, and on most of the
products from China.2 Unlike other trade wars the Trump administration provoked,
in which the responses of other countries have been largely in line with the WTO
rulebook so that the conflicts have not escalated,3 the US-China trade war has been
waged entirely outside the WTO legal framework, and hence has metastasized
beyond the multilateral control.
Avoiding trade wars is one of the key functions of the WTO system. Throughout
the US-China trade conflict, however, the WTO as an institution has been sitting
on the side-lines, watching the trade war unfold and escalate, appearing helpless
and unable to do anything to stop the fight. On this score, the system has failed
spectacularly.
Remarkably, there has been little discussion about the WTO's inability to prevent,
or even ameliorate the largest trade war in history. Many would blame the US for
provoking the trade war and for paralysing the Appellate Body, which has crippled
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.4 It is true that the WTO has been in a
2 For status of the tariff wars, see Chad Bown & Malina Kolb, Trump's Trade War Time//ne:
An Up-to-Date Guide, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL'Y WATCH
(Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-
trade-war-china-date-guide [hereinafter Bown & Kolb].
3 See infra, Part IV.F. text accompanying notes 184-190.
4 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Grading Trump's China Trade Strategy, in 10 EUR. Y.B. INT'L
ECON. L. 217 (M. Bungenberg et al. eds., 2019). The Trump administration has single-
handedly blocked the process of filling any vacancy in the Appellate Body since 2017, citing
systemic concerns about the Appellate Body. As a result, the Appellate Body was reduced
to one member as of December 10, 2019, which is below the minimum three-member
threshold needed to hear new appeals. Although the dispute panel proceedings remain
intact, the dysfunction of the Appellate Body deprives a party of the right to appeal
decisions of dispute panels. See Members urge continued engagement on resolving Appellate Body
issues, WTO (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.wto.org/english/newse/news19_e/dsb_18dec19_e.htm. Currently, except
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crisis provoked by the Trump administration. Yet, what has been overlooked is the
fact that the US-China trade conflict would not have escalated if China had simply
adhered to the requirements of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU). It is important to clarify that under the DSU, the burden of avoiding a
trade war is placed on the "victim" of a WTO violation, rather than on the party
guilty of a WTO violation. Specifically, DSU Article 23 requires that in seeking
redress for a WTO violation, WTO Members must follow the DSU procedure and
must not seek unilateral self-help. It is through this requirement that the WTO
attempts to maintain multilateral control over the timing and scale of retaliatory
measures, thereby preventing a trade dispute from escalating into a trade war.
Unfortunately, this mechanism failed in the case of the US-China conflict. Clearly,
China has breached its obligation under DSU Article 23 by imposing retaliatory
tariffs unilaterally; and the US has violated the same by imposing counter-
retaliatory tariffs unilaterally. With each round of tariff escalation, both countries
have repeated the same WTO-illegal behaviour. But why has the system been
unable to stop these breaches? Is it because WTO law has reached its inherent
limits, given that the conflict is between the two largest economic powers at an
unprecedented scale? If so, there would be little that could be done as a matter of
international law to prevent such a trade war. Or is it because the negotiators of
the DSU never anticipated the possibility of such an occurrence, thus did not
devise the rules necessary for dealing with the contingency? If so, the issue of how
to improve the systemic design should be put on the WTO reform agenda.
This article seeks to understand the causes of WTO's failure to prevent the US-
China trade war and explores what can be done to improve the system. The article
will proceed as follows. Part II will provide an overview of the US-China trade war.
Part III will analyse the illegality of unilateral retaliation under DSU Article 23 and
the lack of possible defences under general international law for the violation of
DSU Article 23. Part IV explores the wisdom of DSU Article 23 discipline. It does
so by explaining the underlying rationale of the DSU rule and by tracing the
evolution of international legal disciplines on trade retaliation. Drawing lessons
from the US-China trade war, Part V will identify a deficiency in the design of the
DSU and propose an additional mechanism for the enforcement of DSU Article
23 discipline. Part VI concludes.
in cases in which the disputing parties agree not to appeal or agree to appeal through
alternative dispute settlement mechanism, such as the interim appeal arbitration mechanism
set up by the EU and other Members (See Interim appeal arrangementfor WTO disputes becomes
effective, EUR. COMMISSION (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfinid-2143), the WTO dispute settlement
system cannot deliver a final binding decision.
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II. THE US-CHINA TRADE WAR: AN OVERVIEW
US-China relations have undergone fundamental changes in the past two decades.
Twenty years ago, it was the support of the US that sealed the deal for China's
accession to the WTO. The US had expected that the WTO accession would help
liberalise China, both economically and politically, thereby transforming the
country into a truly market-based economy and an open society.5 Contrary to US
expectations, China's integration into the global economy has only worked to
strengthen its State-led development model and authoritarian rule. Within the past
two decades, China's economy has grown tenfold, with its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), surpassing that of
the US.6 Today, China is not only the world's manufacturing giant but also a
technology powerhouse. The wealth accumulated at home has fuelled China's
investment overseas and enabled its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative that
challenges the geopolitical status quo.7
It appears that three major concerns drove the US into initiating the trade war: (a)
China's chronically large trade surplus that depresses job creation in the US; (b)
China's acquisition of US technology through illegal and unfair means; and (c) The
perceived China's attempts to weaken US national security and international
standing.8 Specifically, American businesses have long complained about Beijing's
unfair trade practices, including currency manipulation, industrial policies,
government subsidies, State-owned enterprises (SOE), monopolies, intellectual
property (IP) theft, regulatory discrimination, and other implicit trade and
investment barriers. Previous US administrations relied on bilateral consultations
and the WTO multilateral forum to address these complaints.9 Under the Trump
administration, the US has been more willing to abandon multilateralism and
5 See Bill Clinton, President, US, Speech on China Trade Bill at the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University (Mar. 9, 2000).
6 China's nominal GDP was $1.3 trillion in 2001 and grew to $14.3 trillion in 2019. China's
GDP (PPP) reached $23.46 trillion as compared to $21.37 trillion of US GDP (PPP) in
2019. See China, WORLD BANK GROUP, https://data.worldbank.org/country/china; GDP,
PPP (current international $), WORLD BANK GROUP,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD.
7 See United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China, WHITE HOUsE (May 20,
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-
Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf, for the US government's
comprehensive assessment of the China challenges [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE].
8 Tao Liu & Wing Thye Woo, Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War, 11(3) CHINA ECON. J.
319 (2018).
9 However, the view that China's unique politic-economic system threatens the global
trading system had gained traction prior to the Trump era. See Mark Wu, The "China's Inc."
Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57(2) HARV. J. INT'L L. 1001 (2016).
46o [vol. 12:456
Winter, 2020] WTO Reform: Multilateral Control over Unilateral Retaliation 461
pursue aggressive unilateralism instead.10 The United States Trade Representative
(USTR) even declared that it was a mistake to admit China into the WTO," and
that China's State-led economy constitutes an unprecedented threat to the world
trading system.12 Thus, after an initial honeymoon period with Beijing, the Trump
administration launched an investigation into China's practices relating to
technology transfer and IP under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which led
to the beginning of the trade war.13
A. US Section 301 Tanffs
The US-China trade war was officially triggered by the US allegations of China's
unfair trade practices in technology transfer and IP under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974. Section 301, a highly controversial US statute,14 authorises the US
government to take trade actions against a foreign country if it determines that the
foreign country has engaged in "unreasonable or discriminatory" policies or
practices that burden or restrict US commerce.15 In this case, the Office of the
USTR initiated the Section 301 investigations in August 2017 and released its
report on March 22, 2018 (Section 301 Report). 6 The Section 301 Report made
10 In addition to creating the Appellate Body crisis, the Trump administration resorted to
unilateral tariffs to address trade and non-trade related issues with many WTO members.
In addition to the China tariffs, since March 2018, the US has imposed 25% tariffs on steel
and 10% on aluminium from most countries and has threatened 25% tariffs on imports of
automobiles and auto parts, all in the name of national security. On May 30, 2019,
President Trump threated to levy extra tariffs on all imports from Mexico until illegal
immigrants stopped entering into the US through Mexico. For details of the tariff wars, see
Bown & Kolb, supra note 2.




12 Robert Lighthizer, US Trade Poliy Ptonttes, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Sept.
18, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-trade-policy-priorities-robert-lighthizer-
united-states-trade-representative.
13 In April 2017, President Xi Jinping visited President Trump at Mar-a-Largo, which led to
an accord on a "100-day action plan" on economic cooperation. After the 100-day action
plan failed to achieve any result, the USTR initiated the Section 301 investigation in August
2017. The bilateral relations remained stable until after Trump's formal State visit to China
in November 2017.
14 See infra, Part I.E.
15 The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
16 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO CHINA'S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT
OF 1974 (Mar. 22, 2018) [hereinafter SECTION 301 REPORT].
Trade, Law and Development
four findings: (a) China forced US firms to transfer technologies to Chinese
entities via administrative processes and equity restrictions; (b) China's technology
licensing requirements are discriminatory against foreign firms; (c) China
systematically acquired businesses in the US to obtain cutting-edge technologies;
and (d) China was involved in cyber theft of American IP. It estimated that the
cost of Chinese theft of American IP was between $225 billion and $600 billion
annually.17
Based on the findings of the Section 301 Report, the Trump administration
pursued three courses of action.18 First, it levied extra tariffs on Chinese products
(Section 301 tariffs), which was supposed to be a response to China's unfair
practices not covered by existing WTO law,19 and as compensation for the loss of
American IP assets due to such practices.20 Second, it filed a WTO complaint,
claiming that China's technology licensing requirements violated the non-
discrimination requirement of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).21 Third, it amended domestic law to tighten
restrictions on China's direct investment in the US on national security grounds.2 2
17 Id. Appendix C, at 9 (reporting the estimate by the Commission on the Theft of
Intellectual Property (the IP Commission)). It should be noted, however, that the IP
Commission Report reported the same estimated numbers as the total cost of IP theft of
American IP from the entire world, rather than from China alone, although it also
identified China as the worst offender. See NAT'L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, UPDATE
TO THE IP COMMISSION REPORT, THE THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
REASSESSMENT OF THE CHALLENGE AND U.S. POLICY 12-13 (2017).
18 President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China's Unfair Trade, OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong.
19 Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/290/Mar27.DSB_.Stmt_.as-delivered.fin_.rev_-1.pdf., claiming that
three of the four categories of China's practices covered by its Section 301 investigation
"did not appear to implicate specific WTO obligations." Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes
of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 27 March, 2018, WTO Doc. WT /DSB/M/410,
¶ 11.3 (June 26, 2018) [hereinafter US statement at the DSB meeting].
20 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 7.
21 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Certain Measures Concerning
the Protection of Intellectual Propery Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 26, 2018). The
proceeding was later suspended at the request of the US, apparently due to changes in the
relevant Chinese regulation. For status of the dispute, see China - Certain Measures
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Propery Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542 (last update Jan.
16, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/casese/ds542_e.htm.
22 The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 was enacted in August
2018, which provides the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
with greater flexibility in scrutinising foreign direct investment [hereinafter FIRRMA]. For
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The Section 301 tariffs were levied in three rounds. The initial round was
announced on April 3, 2018, and covered $50 billion worth of Chinese products at
the rate of 25%. The tariffs went into effect in the summer of 2018 ($34 billion on
July 6, 2018, and $16 billion on August 23, 2018). In response to China's retaliatory
tariffs of the same magnitude, the US announced the second round of tariffs in
September 2018, which covered an additional $200 billion of Chinese imports,
with a rate of 10% effective on September 24, 2018, to be increased to 25% on
January 1, 2019. The increase to 25% did not take effect until May 10, 2019, after
the negotiations of a promising bilateral deal broke down. In response to China's
second round of retaliatory tariffs, the US announced the third round of the
Section 301 tariffs in August 2019, covering an additional $300 billion of Chinese
products. This third round was implemented in part on September 1, 2019, when
15% tariffs went into effect on $120 billion of Chinese imports. Thanks to the US-
China phase-one trade deal, the remainder of the third-round tariffs was called off
and the then existing 15% rate was reduced by half.23 At the time of writing,
Section 301 tariffs remained in effect for $370 billion of Chinese imports (7.5% on
$120 billion and 25% on $250 billion), covering more than two-thirds of China's
total goods exports to the US.24
B. China's Responses
The initial reaction of China to the Section 301 Report was complete outrage.
China expressed its indignation at the meeting of the WTO Council for Trade in
Goods soon after the release of the Section 301 Report. At the meeting, China
recalled the chequered history of Section 301, condemned the US "resurrection" of
Section 301 investigations as a violation of WTO law, and called on WTO
Members to jointly "lock this beast [of Section 301 investigations] back into the
the impact of the new law on Chinese investment, see S. Dickinson, New CFUS Rules Shut
Down Chinese Investment in U.S. Technology, CHINA L. BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.chinalawblog.com/2019/01/new-cfius-rules-shut-down-chinese-investment-
in-u-s-technology.html.
23 For details of tariffs levied during the US-China trade war, see Chad Bown, US-China
Trade War Tarif/s: An Up-to-Date Chart, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.: CHARTS (Feb.
14, 2020), https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-
chart.
24 See United States and China Reach Phase One Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Dec. 13, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2019/december/united-states-and-china-reach. T e US goods
imports from China totalled $539.5 billion in 2018. See The People's Republic of China, OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-
mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china.
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cage of the WTO rules."25 China also declared that it would "firmly take the WTO
rules and other necessary means to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests"
(emphasis added).26 On April 4, 2018, one day after the US announced its decision
to levy Section 301 tariffs, China responded by: (a) filing a WTO lawsuit against
the US;27 and (b) announcing its decision to levy retaliatory tariffs. 28
Beijing has since continued this two-track strategy. On the WTO front, China has
filed two more WTO complaints challenging the Section 301 tariffs.29 On the front
of retaliatory tariffs, China has adopted a tit-for-tat policy. Whenever the Trump
administration has announced or imposed new tariffs on Chinese products, China
has responded with the announcement or imposition of new retaliatory tariffs. For
the initial round of the Section 301 tariffs, China's retaliation was of the same
magnitude (25% tariffs on $50 billion of US imports). For the second and third
rounds, China's retaliatory tariffs covered less quantity than the US tariffs, as the
total value of US goods exports to China is disproportionally less than that of
Chinese exports to the US.3 To make up the quantitative difference, China applied
25 Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting of the Coundlfor Trade in Goods on 23 and
16 March 2018, G/C/M/131 (Oct. 5, 2018), ¶ 25.4 [hereinafter Minutes of the Meeting of the
Coundlfor Trade in Goods].
26 Id. Notably, except for Japan, the EU and the US, no other WTO Member responded to
China's statement at the meeting. While the US defended its action, Japan and EU both
stated that they shared US concerns about China's IP practice, although the EU also
"called on the relevant parties to ensure that their trade actions were WTO-compliant". Id.
¶¶ 25.5-25.8.
27 See Request for Consultations by China, United States - Tarif Measures on Certain Goods
from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS543/1 (Apr. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Request for
Consultations, April 2018].
28 Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) announced 25%
additional tariffs on $50 billion of US products. See MOFCOM Announcement No. 34 of2018
on Imposing Additional Tariff on Several Imports of Products On ginating in the U.S., MOFCOM
(Apr. 4, 2018),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201804/20180402734699. shtm
1 [hereinafter MOFCOM Announcement No. 34].
29 Request for Consultations by China, United States - Tarif Measures on Certain Goods from
China II, WTO Doc. WT/DS565/1 (Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Request for Consultations
by China, United States - Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II]; Request for
Consultation by China, United States - Tarif Measures on Certain Goods from China III, WTO
Doc. WT/DS587/1 (Sept. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Request for Consultation by China, United
States - Tarif Measures on Certain Goods from China II. At the time of writing, the two cases
remain in the consultation stage.
30 In 2018, US goods exports to China were $120 billion whereas China goods exports to
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varying rates to its retaliatory tariffs, 31 and threatened unspecified "qualitative
measures" against the US.32 After the phase-one deal, more than a half of the US
imports to China remain subject to China's retaliatory tariffs.3 3
In the midst of the trade war, China also took a number of trade liberalisation
measures unilaterally. In 2018, China reduced its Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
tariffs (i.e., tariffs applied on a non-discriminatory basis) on more than 1500
products, ranging from auto parts to medicine to consumer goods, causing its
overall tariff level to drop from 9.8% to 7.5%34 In 2019 and 2020, China further
reduced import tariffs on hundreds of products, including food, medicine, and
information technology goods.35 These measures helped China to partially offset
the adverse effect of its retaliatory tariffs on the US imports. Furthermore, China
eased restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). In June 2018, China adopted
a new "negative list" approach, under which the number of equity restrictions on
FDI has been reduced from sixty-three to forty. 36 More significantly, China
31 In the second round of retaliation implemented between September 2018 and May 2019,
China imposed new tariffs on $60 billion of US goods, with rates varying from 5% to 25%.
In the third round, China announced new tariffs on $75 billion of US goods, with rates
varying from 5% to 10%, which rates were cut in half as a result of the phase-one deal.
Note that the new tariffs hit many of the same products already covered by previous
rounds. See Chad Bown, Phase One China Deal: Steep Tarifs Are the New Normal, PETERSON
INST. FOR INT'L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL'Y WATCH. (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/phase-one-china-deal-
steep-tariffs-are-new-normal [hereinafter Bown].
32 MOFCOM Spokesman Comments on the White House's Statement Released on June 18,
MOFCOM (June 20, 2018),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201806/201806027599
64.shtml. See also Tom Mitchell & Shawn Donnan, China Readies Non-Tariff Weapons in US
Trade Spat, FIN. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4bacf50-7396-11e8-
aa31-31da4279a601; Megan Cassella, China isfinding new ways to hurt US businesses, POLITICO
(Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/27/china-us-busines s-1074184.
33 See Bown, supra note 31.
34 See Further tariff cuts to boost trade, consumption, MOFCOM (Oct. 9 2018),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/services/supplydemandofchina/demand/201810/2
0181002793354.shtml; See also 2019 tarif adjustments announced, DELOITTE (Dec. 24, 2018),
https://www.taxathand.com/article/10960/China/2018/2019-tariff-adjustments-
announced (The MFN rate deductions did not apply to the US).
3s See China will lower import tariffs on over 850 products from Januay 1, finance ministy says, CNBC
(Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/23/china-will-lower-import-tariffs-on-
over-850-products-from-january-1.html; Deloitte, 2020 tarif adjustments announced (Dec. 30,
2019), https://www.taxathand.com/article/12750/China/2019/2020-tariff-adjustments-
announced.
36 Order of the National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China and the
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China No.18 of 2018 on Special Administrative
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adopted a new Foreign Investment Law, which came into effect on January 1,
2020.37 Under the new law, except for sectors specified in the negative list, foreign
investment projects no longer require separate government approval, thus
reversing China's basic FDI policy of the prior forty years.38 The new law also
contains an explicit prohibition of government agencies and their staff from
engaging in "forced technology transfer",39 a practice whose existence Beijing has
consistently denied.
To date, China has articulated its position on the US-China trade conflict in two
white papers. The first paper, released in September 2018, discussed why the US-
China economic relations are mutually beneficial, denied every accusation in the
Section 301 Report of China's unfair trade practices, and condemned the US for
trade protectionism and bullying.40 It articulated several principal positions of
China, the first of which is that China is firmly committed to safeguarding "its
national dignity and core interests". 41 It repeated the standard statement that
"China does not want a trade war, but it is not afraid of one and will fight one if
necessary", but called for the US-China trade disputes to be addressed "through
bilateral consultation or the WTO dispute settlement mechanism."42 The shorter
second paper was issued in June 2019, which condemned the US for provoking the
Measures (Negative List) for Foreign Investment Access (2018 Edition), MOFCOM (June 29, 2018),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201807/20180702765903.shtml;
New Negative List to Further Encourage Foreign Investment, MOFCOM (July 10, 2019),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/counselorsreport/americaandoceanreport/201908/
20190802888874.shtml.
37 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Fa (F A HM AAA ),
(promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020) (China),




38 Id art. 4 (granting foreign investors national treatment with respect to market access in
all sectors other than those specified in the negative list).
39 Id art. 22 (no "forced transfer of technologies"), art. 23 (no disclosure of trade secrets),
art. 39 (penalties).





42 Id Other major positions include China's commitments to the multilateral trading system
and to the policy of further opening-up.
466 [vol. 12:456
Winter, 2020] WTO Reform: Multilateral Control over Unilateral Retaliation 467
trade war and stated explicitly that China had to impose retaliatory tariffs "in
defence of its national dignity and its people's interests."43
C. The Phase-One Trade Deal
After months of on-and-off negotiations, the US and China signed a phase-one
trade agreement on January 15, 2020, which took effect on February 14, 2020.44
The ninety-six page agreement contains eight chapters, addressing IP, technology
transfer, agriculture, financial services, currency, expanding trade, and dispute
resolution. Most of the obligations prescribed in the agreement belong to China,
whereas the US largely affirms the conformity of its existing measures with
prescribed standards.
To implement the agreement, China needs to amend or update various laws and
regulations.45 The provisions on IP are extraordinarily detailed.46 On technology
transfer, the agreement elaborates the specific types of practices to be prohibited.
Together with the IP section on trade secrets, the agreement appears to cover all
types of forced technology transfer alleged in the Section 301 Report.
While its IP provisions are generally positive in enhancing IP protection in China,
the agreement also contains troublesome content. The most problematic is China's
purchase commitment under Chapter 6 "Expanding Trade", which obligates China
to increase imports from the US by $200 billion by the end of 2021.47 Chapter 6
specifies the minimum amount of annual increase in each of the categories of
manufactured goods, agriculture, energy, and services, covering a total of twenty-
43 China's Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultations, STATE COUNCIL OF
CHINA (June 2, 2019),
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/2019/06/02/content_281476694892692
.htm.
44 The Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the




[hereinafter Phase-One Trade Agreement].
4s See Qiao Xinsheng, The Impact of the China-US Trade Agreement on the Chinese Legal System,
WEMP FRONTIERS-OF-LAW (Feb. 11, 2020), https://wemp.app/posts/dae4eaed-82a4-
4bd5-a5e8-865f740a3420.
46 The IP chapter (Chapter 1) consists of eighteen pages. For a comprehensive assessment
of the IP provisions, see Mark Cohen, The Phase 1 IP Agreement: Its Fans and Discontents,
CHINA IPR BLOG (Jan. 21, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/01/21/the-phase-1-ip-
agreement-its-fans-and-discontents/.
4? Phase-One Trade Agreement, supra note 44, art. 6.2.
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three subcategories of products.48 This purchase commitment is viewed as the
centre-piece of the agreement, but few believe that the numbers are realistic.49
Legally, this kind of "managed trade"- targeted imports regardless of market
conditions - betrays the basic WTO principles of market-based trade liberalisation
and non-discrimination.50 The arrangement is reminiscent of trade with completely
central-planned economies.51 To fulfil its gigantic purchase commitment, China
would have no choice but to resort to State trading, i.e., to direct its State-
controlled entities to purchase fixed quantities of American products at the
expense of more efficient producers of other countries.52 In so doing, however,
China may violate Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which regulates State trading activities, and China's Accession Protocol,
which requires China to ensure that "all State-owned and State-invested enterprises
make purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations" and that
"the enterprises of other WTO Members have an adequate opportunity to
compete for sales to and purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory
48 Id. at Annex 6.1.
4 See Chad Bown, Unappredated Hazards of the US-China Phase One Deal, PETERSON INST.
FOR INT'L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL'Y WATCH (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/unappreciated-hazards-
us-china-phase-one-deal; Scott Kennedy, China's Poor Purchasing Peformance: How Should the
United States Respond?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (May 8, 2020),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-poor-purchasing-performance-how-should-united-
states-respond?from=groupmessage&isappinstalled=0 (stating that the ensuing pandemic
"has made the unrealistic the impossible.").
50 See Gary Hufbauer, Managed Trade: Centerpiece of US-Chinaphase one deal, PETERSON INST.
FOR INT'L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL'Y WATCH (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/managed-trade-
centerpiece-us-china-phase-one-deal.
51 For example, in 1967 when Poland acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] as a central-
planned economy, it agreed to increase the total value of imports from GATT countries by
not less than seven percent per annum. See Protocol for the Accession of Poland, GATT
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 15S/46 (1967).
52 See Chad Bown & M.E. Lovely, Trump's Phase One Deal Relies on China's State-Owned
Enterprises, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL'Y WATCH (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-phase-one-deal-
relies-chinas-state-owned-enterprises. For potential impact of the phase-one deal on other
countries, see Caroline Freund et al., When Elephants Make Peace: The Impact of the China-US
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terms and conditions."5 3 Insofar as Beijing's instructions to its State-trading firms
regarding the targeted purchases are kept confidential, China may also violate the
transparency rules of China's Accession Protocol, which requires it to publish, on a
timely basis, all "measures pertaining to or affecting trade."54 In short, to fulfil its
purchase obligations under the agreement, China is almost certain to violate its
WTO obligations. By expanding the role of State trading, China is moving further
away from becoming a truly market-based economy.
The phase-one deal has merely halted the escalation of tariffs. The two countries
are supposed to continue negotiation for a phase-two agreement to tackle more
difficult structural issues, including SOE subsidies and cyber theft.55 The pandemic,
however, has practically ruined that prospect.
D. Impact of the Trade War
Predictably, the trade war has hurt both countries. Compared to the US,56 however,
China appears to have suffered more, both economically and politically. The trade
war hit when the Chinese economy was already under downward pressure. In 2018,
trade accounted for 38% of China's GDP, and the US was China's largest trading
partner and exporting market. 57 The massive scale of Section 301 tariffs has
affected countless Chinese exporters, with small and medium-sized private
enterprises operating at low margins suffering the most. Meanwhile, hundreds of
millions of Chinese consumers have felt the impact of China's retaliatory tariffs on
US imports, especially on American agricultural products, which have caused food
prices to rise.58 More significantly, the uncertainty and unpredictability associated
s3 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/3, ¶ 46
(Nov. 10, 2001).
54 Id. ¶ 334; Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT /L/432
(Nov. 10, 2001), Section 2(C) [hereinafter China's Accession Protocol].
55 J. Bursztynsky, Trump trade adviser Peter Navarro lists what the US wants from China in "phase-
two" trade deal, CNBC (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/16/peter-navarro-
lists-us-demands-from-china-in-phase-two-trade-deal.html.
56 See J. Zumbrun & A. DeBarros, Trade War With China Took Toll on U.S., but Not Big One,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trade-war-with-china-took-
toll-on-u-s-but-not-big-one-11578832381.
57 China Trade Indicators 2018, WORLD BANK: WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOLUTIONS
(2018), https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2018.
58 Anita Regmi, Retaliatory Tarffs and U.S. Agriculture, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Sept. 13,
2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45903.pdf. Almost all US agricultural exports to
China are subject to retaliatory tariffs, ranging from 5% to 50%. For example, Beijing
imposed three rounds of import duties on American pork, raising the total duty from 12%
to 72%. By September 2019, the pork prices nearly doubled. See Felix Chang, Pork
Apocalypse: African Swine Fever and the US - China Trade War, FOREIGN POL'Y RESEARCH
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with the trade war have prompted many firms in global supply chains to leave
China for more stable locations.59 The departure of global supply chains will not
only cause massive unemployment but also hinder the technological advancement
of Chinese industries.
Most seriously, the trade war has escalated the geopolitical tension between the
two countries to the point that threatens to derail bilateral cooperation and
exchanges in every field. Politically, China has received little sympathy from the
international community in fighting the trade war. Rather, US allegations of
China's trade policy and practices have garnered support from the European
Union (EU), Japan and others. Under the circumstances, it is increasingly unlikely
that China will be able to leverage US pressure to deepen its market-based systemic
reform, as many had hoped. Instead, Beijing may retreat further into its State-
centric economic model, which in turn will only exacerbate the conflict.
The trade war has set in motion a trend of US-China decoup/ing, and the trend is
accelerating. The result will have profound implications for the rest of the world.
While the economic impact of the trade war varies-some countries gain from
trade diversion, and some lose by the disruption of global supply chains or
slowdown of the Chinese economy60-the geopolitical impact is rather clear, in
that the growing animosity between the two largest economies is forcing smaller
nations to choose sides. Unfortunately, the negative impact of the trade war is only
being augmented by the ensuing pandemic. The world has been pushed to the
brink of a new Cold War.
III. ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE RETALIATION
INST. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/12/pork-apocalypse-african-
swine-fever-and-the-u-s-china-trade-war/.
s9 See, e.g., Finbarr Birmingham, China's manufacturing exodus set to continue in 2020, despite
prospect of trade deal, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3045141/chinas-
manufacturing-exodus-set-continue-2020-despite (The article reported that for every
foreign company that left China in 2019, there were two to three more seriously
contemplating doing so in 2020).
60 Sherman Robinson & Karen Thierfelder, US - China Trade War: Both Countries Lose,
World Markets Adjust, Others Gain, 19-17 PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (Nov. 2019),
https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/us-china-trade-war-both-countries-lose-
world-markets-adjust-others-gain. See also Patrick van den Bossche et al., Trade War Spurs
Sharp Reversal in 2019 Reshoring Index, Foreshadowing Covid-19 Test of Suppy Chain Resilience,
Operations and Performance, KEARNEY, https://www.kearney.com/operations-performance-
transformation/us-reshoring-index/full-report.
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A central claim of this article is that the WTO system should have been able to
prevent the US-China trade war if it had had a mechanism to compel China to
comply with the WTO rule that prohibits unilateral retaliation. To support this
claim, it is necessary to first demonstrate not only that unilateral retaliatory tariffs
violate WTO law, but also that there is no valid defence for such a violation under
general international law. For, if such unilateral retaliation could be justified under
general international law, the trade war would not have been preventable under the
WTO system.
A. GAT T Articles I and II
At the most basic level, both the US Section 301 tariffs and China's retaliatory
tariffs have violated GATT Article I "General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment",
and Article II "Schedules of Concessions". Under GATT Article I, a WTO
Member is required to treat another Member no less favourably than it treats any
other country with respect to customs duties and related matters (MFN
treatment).61 Because Section 301 tariffs apply to China alone, the US has treated
China less favourably than other Members, thereby breaching its obligation under
Article I. GATT Article II prohibits a Member from raising its customs duties
above the levels set forth in its tariff schedule (tariff bindings).62 By imposing
additional tariffs on China, the US has raised its duties above the scheduled level,
thereby breaching its obligation under GATT Article II. In the first of China's
WTO lawsuits challenging the Section 301 tariffs, the US did not deny that its
measures violated the GATT rules, but defended such violations by invoking the
public morals exception under GATT Article XX(a). 63 The Panel rejected this
defence, finding that the US measures at issue are pima fade inconsistent with
GATT Articles I and II, and that the US has not met its burden of demonstrating
that the measures are justified under GATT Article XX(a). 64
61 GATT, supra note 51, art. I:1.
62 Id. art. I1:1.
63 Panel Report, United States - Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, WTO Doc.
WT/DS543/R (Sept. 15, 2020), ¶ 7.100 [hereinafter Panel Report, US - Section 301
Tariffs]. For article XX(a) jurisprudence, see WTO Analytical Index, GATT 1994 Article XX
Jurisprudence, 1.4,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/publicationse/ai17_e/gatt1994_art20_jur.pdf.
64 Panel Report, US - Section 301 Tariffs, supra note 63, ¶ 8.1. The US has appealed the
Panel decision "into the void", a situation created by the absence of the Appellate Body,
thus preventing the Panel Report from being adopted under DSU article 16.4. See United
States -TarffMeasures on Certain Goodsfrom China, Notification of An Appeal by the United
States under Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), WTO Doc. WT/DS543/10 (Oct. 27, 2020) [hereinafter US
Appeal "into the void'".
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Likewise, China's retaliatory tariffs also violate GATT Article I, because they apply
to the US products alone, and GATT Article II, because they have exceeded the
level of China's tariff bindings set out in its tariff schedule. Since the US has not
brought a WTO complaint against China regarding such retaliatory tariffs, it
remains unclear how China might defend its violation of the GATT rules.65
Notably, however, China has cited "basic principles of international law", rather
than any WTO provision, to justify its unilateral retaliation.66
B. DSU Article 23
In addition to GATT Articles I and II, US Section 301 tariffs and China's
retaliatory tariffs have also violated DSU Article 23, the central rule of the WTO
for preventing trade wars. Unlike the case of their GATT breaches, however, the
two countries differ substantially in the extent of their respective violations of
DSU Article 23.
1. Article 23 Jurisprudence
DSU Article 23 provides:
Article 23 Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of oblgations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements, they shall have resource to, and abide by, the rules and procedures
of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that
benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except
through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such
determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel
65 It should be noted that the Panel in US - Section 301 Tatffs was keenly aware of the
wider context in which the case was decided and seemed to lament the fact that the US had
not initiated a WTO dispute against China's retaliatory measures. See Panel Report, US -
Section 301 Tanif, supra note 63, ¶¶ 9.2-9.3.
66 See MOFCOM Announcement No. 34, supra note 28.
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or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration
award rendered under this Understanding.
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the
reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to
implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of
suspension of concessions or other obigations and obtain DSB authorization
in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other
obigations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the
Member concerned to implement the commendations and rulings
within that reasonable period of time.67 (emphasis added)
Thus, Article 23 requires that a Member must resort to the WTO dispute
settlement procedures and must not take the law into its own hands when seeking
to redress a violation of WTO obligations. More specifically, Article 23 requires a
Member not to make a self-determination that a violation has occurred or to take
any retaliatory action (i.e., suspending concessions or other obligations under the
WTO agreements) without the authorisation of the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). The goal of Article 23 is understood to be the "rejection of unilateral self-
help".68
In practice, Article 23 has been involved in a number of WTO disputes,69 and
violation was established in two of them. The first is US - Certain EC Products.70
The case arose out of US efforts to retaliate against the banana regime of the
European Communities (EC), which had been found to be WTO inconsistent.
The EC requested arbitration under DSU Article 22.6 on the level of retaliation
requested by the US. When the arbitration proceeding was delayed beyond the 60-
day limit imposed by Article 22.6, the US took certain border measures against EC
imports to preserve its rights to suspend tariff concessions. In response to the US
67 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 23,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
68 WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX, DSU - ARTICLE 23 JURISPRUDENCE §1.2.1,
https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/publications-e/ai17_e/dsuart23_jur.pdf.
69 See id.
70 Panel Report, United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the European
Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, US -
Certain EC Products]; Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Measures on Certain
Products from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS165/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10,
2001).
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argument that it was the EC's delaying tactics that frustrated all US efforts to
comply with the DSU, the Panel states:71
[I]t is clear that a Member cannot find in another Member's violation a
justification to set aside the prescription of the DSU. The US argument
(which implies that it considers itself justified to do what it did because
what the European Communities would have done was WTO illegal) is
exactly what is prohibited by Article 23 of the DSU.... In short the
regime of counter-measures, reprisals or retaliatory measures has been
strictly regulated under the WTO Agreement. It is now only in the
institutional framework of the WTO/DSB that the United States could
obtain a WTO compatible determination that the European
Communities violated the WTO Agreement, and it is only in the
institutional framework of the WTO/DSB that the United States could
obtain the authorization to exercise remedial action.
Thus, the US was found to have violated DSU Article 23 by taking retaliatory
measures against the EC before the Article 22.6 arbitration proceedings were
completed. This decision suggests that a Member may not seek self-help in
redressing a WTO violation even in the event of a failure in DSU procedures.
The second case is EC - Vessels.72 At issue here was the EC regulation that
authorised temporary State aid to domestic shipbuilders in order to offset the
effect of South Korea's (Korea) subsidies to its shipbuilding industry. This
temporary State aid was to be granted from the date of the EC's initiation of a
WTO dispute challenging Korea's shipbuilding subsidies until the date one month
after the resolution of the dispute proceedings. The EC did bring a successful
WTO dispute against Korea in which the Korean shipbuilding subsidies were
found to be WTO-illegal.73 Meanwhile, Korea brought this case challenging the EC
regulation under the GATT, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM) and DSU Article 23. The Panel rejected Korea's claims under
GATT and the SCM but found that the EC regulation violated DSU Article 23.
According to the Panel:74
71 Id. ¶ 6.133.
72 Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WTO
Doc. WT/DS301/R (adopted Jun. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC- Commercial
Vessels].
73 See Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WTO Doc.
WT/DS/273/R (adopted Apr. 11, 2005).
74 Panel Report, EC- Commercial Vessels, supra note 72,¶ 7.207.
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[DSU Article 23] covers any act of a Member in response to what it
considers to be a violation of a WTO obligation by another Member
whereby that first Member attempts unilaterally to restore the balance
of rights and obligations by seeking the removal of the WTO-
inconsistent measure, by seeking compensation from that Member, or
by suspending concessions or obligations under the WTO Agreement
in relation to that Member.
This decision thus establishes that a Member may not resort to any unilateral
measure in response to a perceived WTO violation by another Member, even if the
unilateral measure is otherwise WTO-consistent.
In addition to these two cases, the Panel decision in US - Section 301 is also
important to note.75 In this case, the EC challenged the US Section 301 legislation
"as such" violated Article 23, and the US countered that its legislation cannot
violate Article 23 "as such" because it merely authorises the USTR to take remedial
measures after certain determinations are made. The Panel rejected the US
argument and found that certain statutory language of the Section 301 legislation
constitutes a pnmafacie violation of Article 23.76 Although the Panel ultimately did
not hold the US legislation to be inconsistent with Article 23, its final ruling was
conditioned upon the US promise in the Statement of Administrative Action
(SAA), a document submitted by the US President and approved by the Congress,
that the US would always render Section 301 determinations in conformity with its
WTO obligations. Should the US in any way repudiate its undertakings, the Panel
cautioned, its final ruling "would no longer be warranted."77
The above three cases suggest that the rejection of self-help under DSU Article 23
is absolute.
2. US Section 301 Tariffs under Article 23
To address its grievances against China in trade, the US resorted to its historically
controversial legislation of Section 301. In doing so, has the US repudiated its
undertakings,78 thereby violating DSU Article 23? The answer hinges on whether
75 Panel Report, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 1974, WTO Doc.
WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, US - Section 301].
76 Id. ¶ 7.97. The Panel also clarified that a "discretionary" law, under which the
government has discretion in deciding whether to take unilateral measures, may per se
violate article 23 because it can constitute an ongoing threat and create a "chilling effect"
on trade. Id. ¶¶ 7.88-7.92.
77 Id. ¶ 7.136.
78 See id.
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the Section 301 tariffs were used to address a matter arising from "the covered
agreements" of the WTO.79 The US claims that Section 301 measures were
imposed to counter China's unfair practices not covered by the WTO agreements,
and hence do not violate DSU Article 23.80 Notably, the Section 301 Report
carefully avoided making any determination that China's practices had breached
WTO rules.81 Instead of accusing China of violating WTO law by resorting to
retaliatory tariffs, the US claimed that China's retaliation demonstrated its
agreement with the US that the matter does not involve the WTO and that the
parties have settled the matter bilaterally.82
The US argument, however, is not convincing. It is true that the existing WTO
agreements do not regulate all the alleged Chinese practices targeted by the Section
301 tariffs. But "forced technology transfer",83 the major target of the US tariffs, is
at least in principle covered under WTO law. In particular, the Protocol of China's
WTO Accession, which constitutes part of WTO law, obligates China not to
condition any government approval of foreign investment upon the transfer of
technology or the conduct of research and development in China.84 In other
words, WTO law explicitly prohibits Beijing from compelling foreign investors to
transfer technologies to domestic entities. 85 The US claims that the Chinese
government has used indirect and implicit means to coerce technology transfer,
which does not leave a paper trail, thus making it "almost impossible to
prosecute".86 It may be true that existing WTO rules do not effectively regulate all
forms of forced technology transfer. However, the US claim mostly raises an
79 See DSU, supra note 67, art. 1, Appendix I.
80 See US statement at the DSB meeting, supra note 19.
81 Id (stating that the US "had made no findings in the Section 301 investigation that China
had breached its WTO obligation.")
82 First Written Submission of the United States, United States - Tarif Measures on Certain
Goods from China, WT/DS543, ¶¶ 9-10, (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.Sub1.%28DS543%29.fin.%28pu
blic%29.pdf. The US also claimed that the parties had agreed to "settle this matter outside
the WTO system" and the settlement was final within the meaning of DSU article 12.7. See
Panel Report, US - Section 301 Tarifs, supra note 63, ¶ 7.4. The US claim was rejected by
the Panel. Panel Report, US - Section 301 Tarif, supra note 63, ¶ 7.22.
83 The term "forced technology transfer" is not defined, but is understood to cover the
various technology transfer practices of China detailed in the Section 301 Report. See
SECTION 301 REPORT, supra note 16, Part II.
84 China's Accession Protocol, supra note 54, Section 7(3). This commitment was further
elaborated in the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WTO Doc.
WT/ACC/CHN/49, ¶¶ 204-07 (Oct. 1, 2001).
85 This is one of the many China-specific obligations contained in China's Accession
Protocol. See generaly Julia Ya Qin, "W TO -Plus" Obligations and Their Implications for the W1TO
Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003).
86 SECTION 301 REPORT, supra note 16, at 21.
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evidentiary issue under WTO law, which does not change the fact that certain
forms of forced technology transfer as alleged by the US are covered by existing
WTO disciplines.87 This understanding has also been confirmed by EU's WTO
complaint against China, challenging Beijing's technology transfer policy as
inconsistent with its WTO accession commitments.88
On the other hand, the WTO does not contain a generally applicable discipline on
international transfer of technology.89 Recognising that the practice of forced
technology transfer undermines the proper functioning of international trade, the
EU and Japan have joined the US in condemning the practice and in calling for the
development of new rules to discipline the practice.90
In summation, to the extent that the US tariffs were used as the countermeasure
against China's practices specifically covered by WTO rules, they are inconsistent
with DSU Article 23.91 To the extent that they were used to address issues not
covered by existing WTO rules, the US tariffs are outside the domain of DSU
Article 23. It should also be noted that China did make a comprehensive DSU
Article 23 claim in its WTO case against the Section 301 Tariffs. 92 For unknown
87 See Julia Ya Qin, Forced Technology Transfer and the US-China Trade War: Implications for
International Economic Law, 22 J. INT'L ECON. L. 743-762 (2019), Section I.C. [hereinafter
Qin]; Cf Alan Sykes, The Law and Economics of 'Forced" Technology Transfer (FT) and Its
Implications for Trade and Investment Policy (and the U.S.-China Trade War), STAN. L. & ECON.
OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 544 (2020) (treating the difficulty in proving China's violation
of its commitment on technology transfer as the equivalent of a lack of specific WTO rules
on the subject).
88 Request for Consultations by the European Union, China - Certain Measures on the
Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/1/Rev. 1 (Jan. 8, 2019).
89 See generally Qin, supra note 87.
90 See, e.g., Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States
and the European Union, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://ustr.gov/about-us /policy-offices /pres s-office/pres s-releases /2020/j anuary/joint-
statement-trilateral-meeting-trade-ministers-japan-united-states-and-european-union. See
also European Commission, WTO - EU's Proposals on WTO Modernization, COUNCIL OF
EUROPEAN UNION (July, 2018), http://src.bna.com/Aoe.
91 Such DSU article 23 - inconsistent tariffs should include the second and third rounds of
the Section 301 tariffs, since the US imposed these additional tariffs to counter China's
retaliatory tariffs that were clearly in violation of WTO provisions. See Part II.A and Part
III.A. It is also worth noting that the domestic legality of the second and third rounds of
Section 301 tariffs is being challenged by a large number of companies in the US court. See
David Shepardson, Some 3,500 U.S. companies sue over Trump-imposed Chinese tariffs, REUTERS
(Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-china-tariffs/some-3500-us-
companies-sue-over-trump-imposed-chinese-tariffs-idUSL2N2GM166.
92 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, United States - Tariff Measures on
Certain Goodsfrom China, WTO Doc. WT/DS543/7 (Dec. 7, 2018).
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reasons, however, China must have dropped the claim during the panel
proceedings, as the final Panel Report makes no mention of the claim.93
3. China's Retaliatory Tariffs under Article 23
In contrast to the US, China has held from the very beginning that Section 301
tariffs violated WTO law and that its retaliatory tariffs were a response to the US
tariffs. 94 That being the case, China's retaliatory tariffs are, from the outset and in
their entirety, inconsistent with DSU Article 23.
Specifically, in seeking to redress a violation of WTO rules unilaterally, China has
breached the general obligation under DSU Article 23.1 that WTO Members must
use the WTO dispute settlement system "as the exclusive forum" for the
resolution of such dispute. 95 Furthermore, China has breached the specific
obligations under Article 23.2(a) by unilaterally determining that a violation of
WTO rules by the US has occurred, and Article 23.2(c) by suspending its tariff
concessions and MFN obligations vis-a-vis the US without authorisation from the
DSB.
Unlike the obligations of GATT Articles I and II, which are subject to various
general policy exceptions of the GATT, there is no built-in exception available for
the breach of DSU Article 23 under WTO law. The question remains, however,
whether such breach can nonetheless be excused by generally applicable
international law.
C. Possible Defences of China's Unilateral Retaliation under International Law
According to the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
(IOFCOM), China's retaliatory tariffs were a "response to the emergency caused
by the US violation of international obligations to China", and the retaliation was
taken in accordance with relevant domestic Chinese laws and "basic principles of
international law". 96 China's invocation of international law principles appears to
be based on two assumptions: (a) WTO rules are part of public international law;
and (b) basic principles of international law must prevail over specific WTO
obligations. While the first assumption is certainly correct-it has been well
established that WTO provisions are "not to be read in clinical isolation from
93 The Panel Report is completely silent about this major change in the scope of China's
complaint. See Panel Report, US - Section 301 Tari#fs, supra note 63.
94 See MOFCOM Announcement No. 34, supra note 28.
9s Appellate Body Reports, United States/ Canada - Continued Suspension of Oblgations in the
EC-Hormones Dispute, WTO Doc. WT/DS320, 321/AB/R, ¶ 371 (adopted Nov. 14, 2008).
96 MOFCOM Announcement No. 34, supra note 28.
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public international law" 97 -the second assumption is not. Whether basic
principles of international law can prevail over a WTO provision will depend upon
the specific WTO provision at issue and the particular international law principles
invoked.98 The specific WTO provision at issue here is DSU Article 23; it remains
unclear, however, to which basic principles of international law MOFCOM was
referring.
Nonetheless, certain theories have been advanced by Chinese academics to justify
China's retaliatory tariffs. 99 The international legal principles identified for this
purpose include: (a) "self-defence" under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter,
Article 51; (b) "material breach" under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), Article 60; and (c) "necessity" under the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles), Article
25. Of the three principles suggested, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is obviously
inapplicable as it refers to self-defence against "an armed attack" only.100 The other
two theories merit more careful analysis.
1. "Material Breach" under VCLT Article 60
It was suggested that China's violation of DSU Article 23 can be excused by the
material breach doctrine of customary international aw as codified in VCLT
Article 60.101 The relevant provisions are:
9? Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R. (adopted May 20, 1996).
98 See Joost Pauwelyn, Foreword in GRAHAM COOK, A DIGEST OF WTO JURISPRUDENCE
ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES, xvii-xviii (2015) (stating
that a non-WTO treaty can only prevail over a WTO provision if it amounts to a valid
waiver of WTO rights or takes precedence over the WTO provision pursuant to conflict
rules of international law).
99 See Guohua Yang, International Legal Basis of Chinese Trade Countermeasures, 8 J. WTO &
CHINA 3 (2018) [hereinafter Yang].
100 U.N. Charter art. 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security. [hereinafter U.N. Charter]
101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
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Article 60. Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a Treaty as
a Consequence of its Breach
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties
entitles:
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the
relations between itself and the defaulting State;
Thus, Article 60.2(b) permits a party to a multilateral treaty to invoke "material
breach"10 2 as the ground for suspending the operation of the treaty between itself
and the defaulting party. According to this theory, the Section 301 tariffs were of
such nature and scale that they constituted a material breach of the WTO treaty,
and that such breach entitles China (a party specially affected by the breach) to
invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the WTO treaty, in whole or
in part, between itself and the US.
Assuming that VCLT Article 60 applies in the WTO context, which is questionable
as will be discussed below, the theory nonetheless fails for a simple reason: the
remedy provided by Article 60.2 to the victim State of a material breach is the right
to suspend the operation of the relevant treaty between itself and the defaulting
State. Thus, Article 60 might apply if China had declared that as a result of a
material breach by the US, it would suspend the application of the WTO treaty in
whole or in part (e.g., to the extent of GATT Articles I and II and DSU Article 23)
between itself and the US. Logically, China's retaliatory tariffs could not be in
breach of the WTO provisions that had already been suspended. However, Beijing
has never made such a declaration. On the contrary, China has initiated and
maintained multiple WTO lawsuits against the US under the GATT and the DSU
throughout the period in which its retaliatory tariffs have been in effect, including
the three WTO complaints challenging the Section 301 tariffs as violation of
GATT Articles 1:1 and I1:1 and DSU Article 23.103 China would not have had the
legal basis to engage in these WTO disputes if the operation of these WTO
provisions had been suspended between the two countries.
102 Id. art. 60.3. A material breach is defined by article 60.3 as consisting of "(a) a
repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention, or (b) the violation of a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."
103 Request for Consultations by China, United States - Tarnif Measures on Certain Goods from
China II, supra note 29; Request for Consultation by China, United States - Tarif Measures on
Certain Goods from China III, supra note 29.
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Moreover, the applicability of VCLT Article 60.2 in the WTO context is
questionable. Paragraph 4 of Article 60 provides: "The foregoing paragraphs [of
Article 60] are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty applicable in the
event of a breach".104 Paragraph 4 thus "reserves the rights of the parties under any
specific provision of the treaty applicable in the event of a breach." 105 The
provision is an expression of lex speciais derogat legi generai (lex speciais), a generally
accepted technique of interpretation and conflict resolution in international law.106
It suggests that whenever two or more norms address the same subject matter, the
more specific norm should prevail. In the WTO context, the specific "provision of
the treaty applicable in the event of a breach" is Article 23 of the DSU. In addition,
the application of Article 60 in the WTO context is also subject to the general
clause of lex speciais in VCLT Article 5 "Treaties constituting international
organizations and treaties adopted within an international organization", which
states: "The present Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent
instrument of an international organization and to any treaty adopted within an
international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization."
(emphasis added). Accordingly, to the extent that DSU Article 23 and VCLT
Article 60.2 deal with the same subject matter, the former should be given priority.
Notably, this understanding has also been confirmed by WTO jurisprudence.107
2. "Necessity" under the Law of State Responsibility
Alternatively, it was suggested that China's violation of DSU Article 23 can be
excused by the international law of "necessity" as codified in Article 25 of the
Draft Articles, which was adopted by the U.N. International Law Commission
(ILC) in 2001.108 This theory, however, encounters similar difficulties as that of
104 VCLT, supra note 101, art. 60.4.
105 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Report of International Law
Commission to the GeneralAssembly, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.l (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 187 UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1, at 255 (Commentary (10)
to Article 57) [hereinafter ILC Report on Draft IVCLT].
106 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission to
the GeneralAssemby, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702, ¶ 14(5) (2006) [hereinafter The Fragmentation
Report].
107 Panel Report, US - Certain EC Products, supra note 70, ¶ 6.133 (stating that "in the
WTO context, the provision of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of
Treaties (1969) on this matter does not apply since the adoption of the more specific
provisions of Article 23 of the DSU").
108 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with
commentaries, Report of International Law Commission to the General Assemby on the work of its
fify-third session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 11.2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). [hereinafter ILC Report on Draft Articles].
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"material breach" under VCLT Article 60. That is, it must overcome the general
obstacle of the ex speciais provision of the Draft Articles, and the specific obstacle
of the conditions set out in Article 25.
a. Lex Specialis
The Draft Articles formulate, by way of codification and progressive development,
the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of States for their
internationally wrongful acts.109 Like the VCLT, the Draft Articles embody general
rules of international law. As such, the Draft Articles explicitly subject all of its
provisions to the special rules of international law. Article 55, entitled Lex Speci as,
states: "These articles do not appy where and to the extent that the conditions for
the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation
of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of
international law" (emphasis added). As an example of such special rules of
international law, the ILC Commentary cites the WTO DSU."1 Thus, when in
conflict, the DSU shall prevail over the provisions of the Draft Articles.
The application of the special law, however, does not extinguish the relevant
general law. Rather, general law will continue to give direction for the
interpretation and application of the special law and will become fully applicable in
situations not provided for by the special law (gap-filling). Moreover, certain types
of general law, such as jus cogens, may not be derogated by special laws."'
With respect to the law of special systems such as the WTO, the ILC has
additionally identified "regime failure" as a situation in which general law becomes
applicable. According to the ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of
International Law:" 2
Special regimes or the institutions set up by them may fail. Failure
might be inferred when the special laws have no reasonable prospect of
appropriately addressing the objectives for which they were enacted. It
could be manifested, for example, by the failure of the regime's
institutions to fulfil the purposes allotted to them, persistent non-
compliance by one or several of the parties, desuetude, withdrawal by
parties instrumental for the regime, among other causes. Whether a
regime has 'failed" in this sense, however, would have to be assessed above all by an
109 Id at 31 (General Commentary (1)).
110 Id at 140 (Commentary (3) to article 55).
111 The Fragmentation Report, supra note 106, ¶¶ 14(9)-(10).
112 Id ¶ 14(16).
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intepretation of its constitutional instruments. In the event of failure, the
relevant general law becomes applicable (emphasis added).
As an example of regime failure, the Chairman of the ILC Study Group noted:113
A dispute-settlement mechanism under the regime may function so
slowly and inefficiently that damage continues to be caused without a
reasonable prospect of a just settlement in sight. At some such point
the regime will have "failed" - and at that point it must become open
for the beneficiaries of the relevant rights to turn to the institutions and
mechanisms of general international law.
The above passage was cited by the Chinese commentator to suggest that as a
special regime the WTO dispute settlement mechanism had failed because it could
not provide "rapid and effective" remedies to China;114 consequently, China's
retaliatory tariffs should not be subject to the special law of DSU Article 23. This
suggested assessment of regime failure, however, cannot be reconciled with the
fact that, while resorting to unilateral retaliatory tariffs, China has remained actively
engaged in the WTO dispute settlement system,115 including maintaining three
WTO lawsuits on Section 301 tariffs.116 Some may argue that the collapse of the
Appellate Body in December 2019 is a sign of such a regime failure. In this regard,
one should note that China announced its first round of retaliatory tariffs in April
2018.117 At the time, the Appellate Body remained functional, and there was no
113 Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 187 (Apr. 13,
2006).
114 Yang, supra note 99, at 8 (stating that "[i]f WTO dispute settlement mechanisms fail to
provide rapid and effective remedies, it constitutes 'regime failure'. In such cases [the
general law of] 'material breach' and 'necessity' systems shall apply to analyse the Chinese
countermeasures.").
115 Since announcing its retaliatory tariffs in April 2018, China has brought six WTO
complaints, all against the US, and has accepted consultations in four WTO cases brought
by the US, the EU, Brazil, and Canada respectively. In addition, China has participated as a
third party in 26 other WTO cases. See China and the WTO, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countriese/china_e.htm [hereinafter China and
the WTO].
116 Request for Consultations, April 2018, supra note 27; Request for Consultations by
China, United States - Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II, supra note 29; Request
for Consultation by China, United States - Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China III,
supra note 29.
117MOFCOMAnnouncement No. 34, supra note 28.
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indication that China sought self-help in anticipation of a possible collapse of the
WTO appellate mechanism.118
Leaving aside the factual assessment, the legal question here is whether a WTO
Member may unilaterally determine that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
has "failed" so that it can fall back on general international law to deal with a trade
dispute. According to the ILC, whether a regime has failed should be assessed
"above all by an interpretation of its constitutional instruments." 119 The
constitutional instrument of the WTO dispute settlement regime is the DSU.
When a WTO Member enters the DSU, it has accepted the explicit choice of all
other WTO Members to contract out general international law to the extent of the
special regime of the DSU. Thus, "[fjor a WTO member unilaterally to 'contract
back in' on the ground that the special regime is not to its liking or ineffective
cannot be accepted."120 In order to "contract back in" general international law,
the WTO Member would need to withdraw from the DSU regime altogether.
China has never made such a move. On the contrary, China has continued to
participate in WTO panel proceedings and has joined the EU and other Members
in setting up an interim appeal arbitration mechanism under DSU Article 25.121
b. "Necessity" under Article 25 of the Draft Articles
Even assuming that China could unilaterally determine that the WTO dispute
settlement system had failed so that it could fall back on general international law
to justify its retaliatory tariffs, would the suggested theory of "necessity" under the
law of State responsibility provide such justification?
"Necessity" is one of the circumstances specified in Chapter V of the Draft
Articles that preclude the wrongfulness of a State's act not in conformity with its
international obligation. The provision is set out below in full:122
Article 25 Necessity
118 In this context, it is necessary to distinguish China's case from that of the EU, which has
proposed a policy of seeking self-help in situations where a losing party appeals a WTO
panel report "into the void". See infra text at notes 137-143.
119 The Fragmentation Report, supra note 106, ¶¶ 14(9)-(10).
120 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (2003) [hereinafter
PAUWELYN].
121 See Interim appeal arrangementfor WNTO disputes becomes effective, EUR. COMMISSION (Apr. 30,
2020), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id-2143.
122 ILC Report on Draft Articles, supra note 108.
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1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) Is the ony way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril and
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility
of invoking necessity; or
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
(emphasis added)
According to the ILC, the notion of necessity is used to denote those "exceptional
cases" where "the only way" a State can safeguard an essential interest threatened
by a grave and imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other
international obligation of lesser weight or urgency.123 In comparison with the
other specific circumstances under Chapter V,124 necessity will "only rarely be
available" to excuse non-performance of an obligation, and it is subject to strict
limitations to "safeguard against possible abuse."125 To emphasise its exceptional
nature and concerns about possible abuse, Article 25 is cast in negative language
("[n]ecessity may not be invoked... unless").126 In State practice, necessity "has
been invoked to protect a variety of interests, including safeguarding the
environment, preserving the very existence of the State and its people in time of
public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian population. But stringent
conditions are imposed before any such plea is allowed."127
Would China's retaliatory tariffs meet the stringent conditions of Article 25? Firstly,
it is difficult to see why the imposition of China's retaliatory tariffs was the ony way
to safeguard its interest. As the ILC noted, the plea of necessity is excluded "if
there are other (otherwise lawful) means available even if they may be more costly
123 ILC Report on Draft Articles, supra note 108, at 80 (Commentary (1) to Article 25).
124 Such other circumstances specified in Chapter V include: consent (art. 20); self-defence
in accordance with the U.N. Charter (art. 21); countermeasures taken in accordance with
the Draft Articles (art. 22); force majeure (art. 23); distress (art. 24); and compliance with
peremptory norms (art. 26).
125 ILC Report on Draft Articles, supra note 108, at 80 (Commentary (2) to Article 25).
126 Id at 83 (Commentary (14) to Article 25).
127 Id.
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and less convenient."128 As will be demonstrated in Part IV below, relying on the
WTO dispute settlement exclusively would have been a less costly as well as a
lawful way for China to counter the US Section 301 tariffs. Moreover, what
constitutes a grave and imminent peal must be "objectively established" and not
"merely apprehended or contingent."129 Citing the International Court of Justice,
the ILC stated that "the invoking State could not be the sole judge of the
necessity". 130 Given these stringent conditions, it is unlikely that China could
successfully invoke necessity to justify its retaliatory tariff under Article 25.
3. "Countermeasures" under the Law of State Responsibility
In addition to the necessity theory, it is instructive to examine whether China's
retaliatory tariffs could otherwise be justified as "countermeasures" under the
general law of State responsibility. Legally, countermeasures are to be distinguished
from the termination or suspension of treaty relations on account of a material
breach of a treaty as provided by VCLT Article 60.131 There, the legal obligations
of the State parties under the treaty will be terminated or suspended as the result of
the material breach. In contrast, countermeasures do not affect the continuing
operation of the treaty. Instead, they are taken "in derogation from a subsisting
treaty obligation" and are "justified as a necessary and proportionate response to
an internationally wrongful act of the State against which they are taken."1 32 Since
China has never terminated or suspended its WTO treaty relations with the US, its
retaliatory tariffs can be properly characterised as "countermeasures" under the
Draft Articles.
In principle, countermeasures meeting the conditions set out in the Draft Articles
do not give rise to State responsibility.133 There are, however, certain types of
obligations that may not be impaired by countermeasures. Article 50 "Obligations
128 Id at 83 (Commentary (15) to Article 25).
129 Id at 83 (Commentary (15) & (16) to Article 25).
130 Id at 83 (Commentary (16) to Article 25 citing International Court of Justice, Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, ¶51).
131 Id at 128 (Commentary (4) to Chapter II Countermeasures).
132 Id See generally PAUWELYN, supra note 120, at 228-236 (explaining the relationship
between countermeasures under general international law of State responsibility and
countermeasures under WTO law).
133 Art. 22 of the Draft Articles, "Countermeasures in respect of an internationaly wrongful act";
provides that "[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an
international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act
constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with Chapter II of
Part III." Chapter II of Part III of the Draft Articles, comprising articles 49-54, set out the
conditions for the taking of countermeasures by an injured State. ILC Report on Draft
Articles, supra note 108.
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not affected by countermeasures" identifies two categories of such obligations.
The first category, provided in Article 50.1, lists four types of obligations reflecting
peremptory norms of international law.134 The second category, provided in Article
50.2, comprises two types of obligations, one of which is the obligations "under
any dispute settlement procedure applicable" between the State taking
countermeasures and the State responsible for the wrongful act against which
countermeasures are taken.135 As the ILC explains, it is a well-established principle
that "dispute settlement provisions between the injured and the responsible State
and applicable to their dispute may not be suspended by way of countermeasures.
Otherwise, unilateral action would replace an agreed provision capable of resolving
the dispute giving rise to the countermeasures [in the first place]."1 36
Accordingly, the WTO Member's obligations under the DSU procedures may not
be suspended by way of countermeasures. This conclusion, however, is predicated
on the assumption of proper functioning of the DSU procedures. After the
collapse of the Appellate Body, the EU has proposed an amendment to its
regulation on the application and enforcement of international trade rules. This
amendment would permit the EU to take countermeasures in situations where,
after the EU has obtained a favourable ruling from a WTO dispute settlement
panel, the process is blocked because the other party appeals the panel decision
"into the void" and has not agreed to interim appeal arbitration under Article 25 of
the DSU.137 The proposed amendment justifies this position by invoking general
international law. Specifically, it cites Article 52 of the Draft Articles, which
establishes procedural conditions "for the taking of countermeasures in a context
where compulsory third-party settlement of disputes may not be available."138
Where a third party procedure exists and has been invoked by either party to the
134 The four types are: (a) the obligations to refrain from the use of force as embodied in
the U.N. Charter; (b) the obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; (c)
obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals; and (d) other obligations
under peremptory norms of international law). Id. art. 50.1.
135 Art. 50.2 provides: "A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its
obligations: (a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the
responsible State; (b) to respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises,
archives and documents." Id. art. 50.2.
136 Id. at 133 (Commentary (13) to Article 50, citing the ICJ in Appeal Relating to the
Junsdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan) Judgement, I.C.J. Rep. 1972 (Aug. 18), and
the Court in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v.
Islamic Republic of Iran) Judgement, 1979 I.C.J. Rep. 1 (Nov. 4)).
137 European Commission, Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the
exercise of the Union's rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules, COM
(2019) 623 final, 2019/0273 (COD), Dec. 12, 2019, at 3 [hereinafter the EUproposal{.
138 ILC Report on Draft Articles, supra note 108, at 136 (Commentary (2) to Article 52).
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dispute, the requirements of procedure "should substitute as far as possible for
countermeasures."139 Yet, the injured State will be relieved of its obligation not to
take countermeasures when the dispute is pending before an international tribunal
"if the responsible State fails to implement the dispute settlement procedures in
good faith."140 According to the ILC, the good faith condition comprehends
various possibilities of non-cooperation in the dispute settlement procedures,
including "situations where a State party fails to cooperate in the establishment of
the relevant tribunal or fails to appear before the tribunal once it is established."141
The EU proposal thus assumes that a Member is not acting in good faith if it
blocks the DSU dispute procedures by appealing a panel decision "into the void"
while refusing to participate in an alternative appeal procedure. In such situations,
the EU believes that it has the right to take unilateral countermeasures, despite the
requirement of DSU Article 23.142
The rationale of the EU proposal, however, does not apply to the China case.
Since China resorted to countermeasures before the relevant WTO panel
proceedings even began,143 and since the US participated fully in the relevant panel
proceedings, China will not be able to rely on this theory to justify its
countermeasures under the Draft Articles.
To summarise, China's retaliatory tariffs violated DSU Article 23, and China does
not appear to have a valid defence for the violation under either the VCLT or the
law of State responsibility.
IV. THE WISDOM OF DSU ARTICLE 23
The legal conclusions reached above may seem counterintuitive and even unfair to
China. After all, it was the US that initiated WTO-illegal actions against China, nd
China merely responded in kind. It seems that the basic notion of fairness would
dictate that China should have the right to retaliate against the US in a timely
139 Id.
140 Id. art. 52.4.
141 Id. at 137 (Commentary (9) to Article 52).
142 The EU proposal does not explicitly mention DSU Article 23. But see Trung Nguyen,
The Procedural Inconsistency of the Envisaged EU Enforcement Regulation with the EU Enforcement
Regulation with the EU's WITO Obligations, OPINIo JuRIS (Oct. 30, 2020),
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/ 10/30/the-procedural-inconsistency-of-the-envisaged-eu-
enforcement-regulation-with-the-eus-wto-obligations/ (suggesting that the EU proposal is
inconsistent with DSU Article 23).
143 China filed its panel request in DS543 on December 6, 2018. See United States - Tarif
Measures on Certain Goods from China, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China,
WTO Doc. WT/DS543/7 (Dec. 7, 2018).
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fashion, not having to trudge through the time-consuming multilateral procedures.
This intuitive reaction, while understandable, is mistaken.
A. The Nature of Trade War
In the US-China trade war, it is common to perceive the US Section 301 tariffs as
an act of aggression and China's retaliatory tariffs an act of self-defence. A
fundamental problem with this perception is that it confuses the nature of a trade
war with that of a military conflict. In a military conflict, a State uses armed forces
to invade another State's territory or otherwise attack its citizens or property. In
doing so, the aggressor State violates the sovereignty of the other State, thus
triggering the "inherent right of self-defence" of the latter.144 In contrast, a State
that initiates a trade war raises its tariff or non-tariff barriers to prevent foreign
products from entering into its own territory. While they hurt the economic
interest of the exporting country, the elevated trade barriers are protectionist in
nature, i.e., they are supposed to protect domestic producers from foreign
competition. Legally, a State does not have an inherent sovereign right to export its
products to other countries. Rather, its export interests are protected through
specific trade agreements applicable to it, subject to all the conditions therein.
Given the fundamental differences between a military attack and a trade barrier,
how should a State react when its export interests are hurt by the trade barrier? As
commonly understood, trade measures are double-edged swords. While high
import tariffs injure the export interests of other countries, they also reduce the
overall economic welfare of the country imposing the tariffs. Thus, if the injured
country retaliates by raising its import tariffs, it will end up exacerbating the injury
to its own economy. Worse yet, the retaliatory measures may provoke counter-
retaliatory measures, leading to a downward spiral in international relations. More
ominously, the hostility between the two countries may persist and develop to the
point that it threatens a military conflict. It is based on this common understanding
that the multilateral trading system was established after World War II (WWII) to
promote economic prosperity and world peace.145
A brief review of the history leading up to the adoption of DSU Article 23 will
help us better understand the political-economic rationale of the provision.
144 U.N. Charter, supra note 100.
145 The WTO can ... contribute to peace and stabiigy, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/10thi_e/10thi09_e.htm [hereinafter
WTO- Peace & Stability].
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B. Adam Smith on Reta/iation in a Trade War
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith writes about retaliation in a trade war. He
observes that "when some foreign nation restrains by high duties or prohibitions
the importation of some of our manufactures into their country", revenge
"naturally dictates retaliation" and that "we should impose the like duties and
prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into ours.
Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner." 146 He cites a number
of examples in history, including the Franco-Dutch war of 1672 which "seems to
have been in part occasioned" by a commercial dispute. However, Smith cautions
against the policy of trade retaliation:147
There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a
probabiity that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions
complained of The recovery of a great foreign market will generally more
than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying dearer during a
short time for some sorts of goods. . . . When there is no probability that
any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of
compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to do
another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the
other classes of them. (emphasis added)
But who shall be the judge of whether retaliations are likely to induce the foreign
nation to repeal its high duties or prohibitions? Unfortunately, the decision to
pursue retaliation is often made by "that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called
a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary
fluctuations of affairs."1 48
On the effect of trade retaliation, Smith further states that while trade retaliation
will certainly benefit some particular class of workmen by excluding some of their
foreign rivals, it will not help those workmen who suffered by the foreign country's
prohibition of importation. He says: 149
On the contrary, they and almost all the other classes of our citizens
will thereby be obliged to pay dearer than before for certain goods.
Every such law, therefore, imposes a real tax upon the whole
146 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF




149 Id at 375.
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country, not in favour of that particular class of workmen who were
injured by our neighbours prohibition, but of some other class.
To sum up, Adam Smith believes that retaliation in a trade war can sometimes
force the offending country to lower its tariffs, but more often than not, the
reverse happens.150 Sadly, his view has been confirmed again nearly two and a half
centuries later. To date, China's retaliatory tariffs have not induced the US to
repeal its original Section 301 tariffs; instead, they have led to escalations of US
tariffs hurting a greater number of Chinese exporters on the one hand, and on the
other, forced all Chinese citizens to pay dearer than before for American imports.
And more ominously, the hostility generated by the trade war has brought the two
countries to the brink of a new Cold War.
C. The Havana Charter
In the aftermath of WWII, the U.N. sponsored a Conference on Trade and
Employment, which adopted the Havana Charter (Charter) for an International
Trade Organization (ITO) in March 1948.151 The Charter set out comprehensive
rules for international trade and other economic matters, including employment,
economic development, commercial policy, restrictive business practices, inter-
governmental commodity agreements, the ITO, and settlement of disputes. Even
though the Charter never came into force, primarily due to the lack of US
ratification, some provisions of the Charter survived though their adoption into
the GATT; and the goal of having an international trade organization was
eventually realised by the establishment of the WTO.1 2
One of the most remarkable features of the Charter is its provisions on dispute
settlement. For the first time in history, the nations of the world agreed to
surrender their power to retaliate in international trade to the control of an
international organisation. The basic principle is set out in Article 92 of the Charter:
Article 92: Reliance on the Procedures of the Charter
1. The Members undertake that they will not have recourse, in relation to
other Members and to the Organization, to any procedure other than
150 Id.
151 See Int'l Trade Org., Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948),
https://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/havanae.pdf. [hereinafter Havana Charter].
152 The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/fact4e.htm.
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the procedures envisaged in this Charter for complaints and the settlement
of differences arising out of its operation.
2. The Members also undertake, without prejudice to any other
international agreement, that they nill not have recourse to unilateral
economic measures of any kind contray to the provisions of this Charter.
(emphasis added)
Thus, the ITO was granted exclusive jurisdiction over disputes among its Members
arising out of the Charter, and the Members were obligated not to resort to any
unilateral economic measure contrary to the Charter. Note that reflecting the
broad range of economic matters covered by the Charter, this obligation extended
to unilateral "economic measures of any kind" rather than "trade measures" only.
With respect to the methods for resolving economic disputes, the Charter
prescribed consultation, binding arbitration, reference to the Executive Board and
ultimately to the Conference consisting of all Members, and review of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).153 Procedurally, only the Executive Board and
the Conference were to have the authority to release a Member from its
obligations under the Charter (i.e., "retaliation'".154 At the request of an affected
Member, the decision of the Conference was to be subject to review by the ICJ in
the form of an advisory opinion, which would be binding on the ITO.155
These dispute settlement provisions "introduced a new principle in international
economic relations."156 Through these provisions, the drafters of the Charter
sought to "tame retaliation, to discipline it, to keep it within bounds" and "to
convert it from a weapon of economic warfare to an instrument of international
order."157 This lofty goal of the Charter, however, was not fully realised until the
adoption of DSU Article 23 under the WTO.
153 Havana Charter, supra note 151, arts. 93-96.
154 Id. arts. 94.3 & 95.3. The Member against which the suspension of performance of a
Charter obligation had been authorised would be free to withdraw from the ITO within
sixty days. Id art. 95.4.
155Id arts. 96.2 & 96.5.
156 U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Economic and Social Council, 2nd Sess.,
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D. GATT 1947
While the Charter was being negotiated, a group of twenty-three countries
concluded a separate agreement on the reduction of tariffs - the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) - which took effect on January 1,
1948, through a Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA).158 It was anticipated
that GATT 1947 would be absorbed by the Charter once the latter entered into
force.159 As a temporary agreement, GATT 1947 did not provide for detailed
institutional arrangements. On dispute settlement, it incorporated certain elements
from the Charter, including nullification or impairment, violation and non-
violation claims, consultation and adjustment, and reference of a dispute to the
joint action of all CONTRACTING PARTIES which could authorise one
CONTRACTING PARTY to suspend the application of its obligations to
another.160 However, GATT 1947 did not adopt the strict discipline of Article 92
of the Charter on the exclusion of unilateral measures.
Despite its "birth defects,"161 GATT 1947 evolved into a successful world trading
regime that preceded the WTO. Out of necessity, the GATT regime developed its
own dispute settlement mechanism in practice. Its dispute procedures resembled
that of institutional arbitration, except that the decision of a GATT dispute
settlement panel was not effective unless it was adopted by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, the collective of all CONTRACTING PARTIES of the GATT.
Most critically, the decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES were taken by
consensus only.162 As a result, the losing party in a dispute could veto the panel
decision, rendering compliance with GATT dispute settlement decisions entirely
voluntary.163
158 For an account of this history, see Roy Santana, GATT 1947 and the gruelling task of signing,
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/task_of signingse.htm.
159 GATT article XXIX sets out the legal relations between GATT and Havana Charter.
For historical background, see DOUGLAS IRWIN, ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT
(2008).
160 GATT arts. XXII & XXIII.
161 John H. Jackson, The Case of the World Trade Organization, 84(3) INT'L AFFAIRS 437, 441
(2008).
162 This was the practice despite the fact that GATT article XXV provides for a majority
voting of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
163 Despite the voluntary nature of GATT compliance, a large number of GATT dispute
settlement decisions were not blocked. That is mainly because the losing parties had a long-
term systemic interest and knew that excessive use of the veto right would result in a
response in kind by others. See Historical development of the WLTO dispute settlement system,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispsettlementcbt e/c2s1p1_e.htm.
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Legally, even though GATT 1947 did not provide for exclusive GATT jurisdiction
over disputes arising from its operation, a CONTRACTING PARTY resorting to
unilateral retaliatory measures without the approval of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES would still violate its GATT obligations, such as tariff bindings and
MFN. Yet, as a practical matter, it was difficult to establish the GATT-illegality of
unilateral retaliatory measures, since any challenge to such measures could be
blocked by the defendant party.164
In practice, the GATT era witnessed various episodes of retaliatory measures and
countermeasures taken unilaterally by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, especially
by the US and the European Economic Community.165 Some of such measures
and countermeasures were taken pending the resolution of GATT disputes, and
some were adopted entirely outside the GATT framework. A majority of these
disputes were eventually settled bilaterally. 166 In fact, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES managed to authorise retaliatory measures only once in the entire
history of the GATT.167
In sum, the GATT system lacked an effective multilateral discipline over unilateral
retaliation.
E. DSU Article 23: Born of a Grand Bargain
The new discipline of DSU Article 23 over unilateral retaliation was born of a
grand bargain between the US and other CONTRACTING PARTIES during
the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1993), which led to the establishment of
164 From the US perspective, unilateral retaliatory measures were justified under the GATT
system because the approval of retaliation by the CONTRACTING PARTIES could be
blocked by the defendant party. See Panel Report, US - Section 301, supra note 75, ¶ 4.75.
165 For a list of unilateral retaliatory and counter-retaliatory measures involving the US from
1975 to 1989, see ROBERT HUDEC, Thinking about the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 198-203, Appendix 1 (1999)
[hereinafter HUDEC].
166 Id.
167 This decision was taken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on November 8, 1952,
adopting the Report of the Working Party and the Determination on the Netherlands
measures of suspension of obligations to the US. See GATT Analytical Index, art. XXIII
Jurisprudence 693,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/publicationse/ai17_e/gatt1994_art23_jur.pdf. For a
number of unsuccessful requests for GATT authorisation of retaliations, see GATT
Analytical Index, art. XXIII Jurisprudence 692-700,
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/publicationse/ail7_e/gatt1994_art23_jur.pdf.
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the WTO in 1995.168 The grand bargain, in turn, was occasioned by the US Section
301 legislation.
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the US pushed an agenda of new trade
disciplines and reform of dispute settlement, but its efforts were met with strong
resistance from other countries.169 Frustrated with the lack of progress in the
multilateral negotiations, the US resorted to aggressive unilateral action. In 1988,
the US adopted a new trade law that amended Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974.170 The amendment authorised the US government to take unilateral trade
measures to retaliate against a wide range of foreign practices, including not only
foreign measures that allegedly violated GATT rules, but also practices that were
not covered by the GATT but were deemed by the US as "unreasonable", such as
inadequate IP protection and barriers in service trade.171
The American aggressive unilateraLism was nearly universally condemned. 172
According to the US, however, its unilateral measures were "necessitated by the
failure of bilateral or multilateral efforts to address a problem", and the way to
minimise or avoid unilateralism was "to create a credible multilateral system - by
strengthening the existing system."173
Concerned that American unilateralism would have a destructive effect on the
GATT, other countries dramatically changed their position.174 In the end, a grand
bargain was struck. In exchange for the agreement of other countries to abandon
the veto in the dispute settlement system, the US agreed to give up unilateral
enforcement of its rights under the Uruguay Round multilateral agreements, which
covered new subjects of IP protection and trade in services. The former part of the
bargain is reflected in the "negative consensus" rules of DSU Articles 6 and 16 that
make the establishment of panels and the adoption of panel reports effectively
168 For a brief overview of the Uruguay Round, see The Uruguay Round, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/fact5_e.htm.
169 Both developed and developing countries opposed to reform proposals of limiting the
power of losing parties under the consensus principle, arguing that GATT adjudication
should remain consensual and that it would not be productive to force governments into
proceedings and rulings that they were not prepared to accept voluntarily. See HUDEC, supra
note 165, n.23.
170 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. (1988).
171 HUDEC, supra note 165.
172 See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI & HUGH PATRICK, AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1990).
173 Council, Discussion on Unilateral Measures (Feb. 8-9, 1989), GATT Doc. C/163, at 4 (Mar.
16, 1989).
174 HUDEC, supra note 165, at 198.
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automatic,175 and the latter part in DSU Article 23, titled "Strengthening of the
Multilateral System".176
It may seem ironic that the new WTO discipline on unilateral trade retaliation
should have been occasioned by the US aggressive unilateralism. The irony,
however, can be explained in part by the theory that certain American actions
should be characterised as "justified disobedience".177
F. The Function ofArticle 23 and Its Limits
As previously discussed, the rejection of self-help under DSU Article 23 is absolute.
In this sense, DSU Article 23 has achieved the goal of Article 92 of the Charter,
namely, to "tame retaliation, to discipline it, to keep it within bounds" and "to
convert it from a weapon of economic warfare to an instrument of international
order."178
That said, Article 23 has its limits. The ban on self-help applies only when it is used
to counter: (a) a violation of WTO obligations; (b) other nullification or
impairment of benefits under the WTO agreements or (c) an impediment to the
attainment of any objective of the WTO agreements.179 Therefore, to the extent
that Section 301 tariffs are used to address China's practice in areas not covered by
the WTO agreements, such as outbound foreign investment and cyber theft, DSU
Article 23 will have no say. Unfortunately, WTO Members have failed to enact
major new multilateral disciplines for more than two decades, leaving the field
open for aggressive unilateral measures to address new issues. Some suggested that
the resurgence of US unilateral action under Section 301 could be seen in the same
light as what was historically described as a form of civil disobedience.180 Yet, the
Trump administration's willingness to weaponise tariffs has extended to areas far
175 Negative consensus, also known as reverse consensus, means a consensus in the DSB
against the establishment of a panel or the adoption of a panel report.
176 ANDREW GUZMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 161 (3d ed., 2016).
177 This theory was suggested by the late Professor Hudec, who upon analysing different
components of the Section 301 legislation concluded that those US measures aimed to
overcome inertia in the Uruguay Round negotiations should be deemed as "justified
disobedience." See HUDEC, supra note 165.
178 Id
179 DSU, supra note 67, art. 23.1.
180 CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, CIGI EXPERT
CONSULTATION ON WTO REFORM, SPECIAL REPORT: SPRING 2019, at 13,
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/WTO%20Special%20Report_
0.pdf. [hereinafter CIGI Spedal Report].
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beyond the scope of WTO trade negotiations.181 In this sense, DSU Article 23 has
not tamed unilateral retaliation.
Nonetheless, DSU Article 23 can keep aggressive unilateralism in bounds. This is
because an aggressive use of unilateral measures, such as the Section 301 tariffs,
inevitably results in the breach of GATT rules on tariffs bindings and MFN, thus
triggering the application of Article 23. By banning unilateral countermeasures,
such as China's retaliatory tariffs, Article 23 can prevent escalation of a trade
conflict.
It is critical to understand that DSU Article 23 places the burden of avoiding a
trade war on the Member responding to a (perceived) WTO violation. This design
makes sense. A trade war-in which two countries engage in tit-for-tat retaliations
against each other-cannot happen with an "aggressor" acting alone. More
importantly, whether the aggressor's initial action is indeed a WTO violation
remains to be determined by a WTO tribunal. Until such a determination is made,
the only effective means to prevent escalation of a trade conflict is to ask the
"victim" to refrain from unilateral retaliation.
Meanwhile, one must keep in mind that Article 23 does not prohibit trade
retaliation per se. Once a WTO tribunal renders a guilty verdict on the aggressor's
action, the victim may begin to pursue remedies available under the DSU. If the
aggressor fails to withdraw the offending measure on a timely basis or otherwise
offer satisfactory compensation, the victim is guaranteed-thanks to the negative
consensus rule-to receive DSB authorisation for retaliation, provided that the
level of retaliation is approved by the DSB.182 Thus, what Article 23 does is to
181 For example, in 2019 President Trump threatened tariffs on all Mexican goods to get
Mexico on board to help curb the tide of immigrants at the US southern border. See Makini
Brice, Trump threatens more tarffs on Mexico over part of immigration deal, REUTERS (June 10,
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-mexico/trump-threatens-more-
tariffs-on-mexico-over-part-of-immigration-deal-idUSKCN1TB182. In 2020, President
Trump considered new tariffs on China as punishment for China's role in the pandemic.
See Jeff Mason et al., Trump threatens new tariffs on China in retaliation for coronavims, REUTERS
(Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-china/trump-
threatens-new-tariffs-on-china-in-retaliation-for-coronavirus-idUSKBN22C3DS.
182 To date, China has obtained the DSB authorisation to retaliate against he US in two
cases. See Panel Report, United States - Certain Methodologies and Their Application to
Antidumping Proceedings Involving China, WTO Doc. WT/DS471/ARB (adopted Nov. 1,
2019) (authorising China to suspend WTO obligations in the amount of $3.578 billion per
year); Panel Report, United States - Countenrailing Duy Measures on Certain Products from China,
WTO Doc. WT/DS437/30 (adopted Oct. 18, 2019) (Recourse to article 22.2 of the DSU
by China) (The final amount of retaliation authorised will be determined by the WTO
arbitration).
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exert multilateral control over the timing and scale of trade retaliations. In terms of
timing, the length of time needed to go through the DSU procedures may help
provide a cooling-off period for the victim.1 83 In terms of scale, a DSB-authorised
retaliation has the legitimacy that will deter counter-retaliation, thereby avoiding
escalation of a trade conflict.
To illustrate the significance of such multilateral control, it is helpful to compare
the US-China trade war with the metal tariff wars waged between the US and a
number of WTO Members. In the spring of 2018, the Trump administration
imposed additional import tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminium (10%) on the
grounds of national security under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. The US metal tariffs apply to products originated in all countries except for a
few that have managed to negotiate a bilateral deal with the US.184 The EU and
eight other Members brought WTO complaints against the US metal tariffs,
characterising such tariffs as "safeguard measures" not taken in accordance with
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards (Safeguard Agreement). 185 This
characterisation provided these Members with a plausible basis for imposing
retaliatory tariffs on US products under Article 8.2 of the Safeguard Agreement,
which authorises an exporting Member affected by a safeguard measure to suspend
equivalent level of concessions and other GATT obligations. The US disagreed
with this characterisation, insisting that its metal tariffs are measures necessary to
protect its essential security interests, as permitted by GATT Article XXI. 186
Meanwhile, the US also brought WTO complaints against these Members,
challenging their retaliatory tariffs as inconsistent with GATT Articles I and I1.187
At the time of writing, the two sets of WTO disputes remain pending.
183 Some might argue that "justice delayed is justice denied". While a prolonged process of
dispute settlement weakens WTO rule of law, this argument nonetheless reflects certain
misunderstandings about the nature of trade wars. See supra Part IV.A.
184 Countries having struck such bilateral deals are Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Canada
and Mexico. The extent and conditions of the exemption from the US metal tariffs vary
depending on the country. For unclear reasons, Australia has been completely exempted
from the metal tariffs from the outset. See generaly Bown & Kolb, supra note 2.
185 See United States - Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS544/1 (China), WTO Doc. WT/DS547/1 (India), WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1
(EU), WTO Doc. WT/DS550/1 (Canada), WTO Doc. WT/DS551/1 (Mexico), WTO
Doc. WT/DS552/1 (Norway), WTO Doc. WT/DS554/1 (Russia), WTO Doc.
WT/DS556/1 (Switzerland), and WTO Doc. WT/DS564/1 (Turkey). Canada and Mexico
settled their disputes with the US respectively in July 2019.
186 See, e.g., Communicationsfrom the United States, WT/DS548/13 (July 6, 2018).
187 See Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS557/1
(Canada), WTO Doc. WT/DS558/1 (China), WTO Doc. WT/DS559/1 (EU), WTO Doc.
WT/DS560/1 (Mexico), WTO Doc. WT/DS561/1 (Turkey), WTO Doc. WT/DS566/1
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Unlike the US-China trade war, the metal tariff wars have been fought within the
WTO legal framework, and hence, have not escalated out of control. The
characterisation of the metal tariffs as "safeguard measures" may be merely a fig
leaf to cover the desire of the several Members for revenge188-Article 8.2 of the
Safeguard Agreement is one of the few WTO provisions that permit a Member to
take retaliatory measures on its own.189 But that fig leaf has effectively prevented
an escalation of the metal tariff wars. Instead of imposing counter-retaliatory tariffs
unilaterally, the US went to WTO dispute settlement o challenge the legality of the
retaliatory tariffs imposed by several Members. In contrast, in the case of Section
301 tariffs, the lack of a legal cover for China's retaliatory tariffs has allowed the
US to impose counter-retaliatory tariffs time and again. Waged outside the WTO
legal framework, the US-China trade war has no predictable endpoint or limit on
its scale. By the same token, as long as a trade war is fought within the WTO legal
framework, be it antidumping or countervailing duty levies or disguised nontariff
barriers, it is unlikely to spiral out of control because the endpoint and scale of the
conflict will be largely predictable within the legal framework.190
Some may argue that China's decision to retaliate unilaterally, even if legally
untenable, is nonetheless understandable in light of the unprecedented scale of the
Section 301 tariffs.191 This argument seems to assume that if a WTO violation (e.g.,
the levy of Section 301 tariffs) reaches a certain scale, DSU Article 23 will lose its
effectiveness. From the standpoint of economic rationale, however, the larger the
(Russia), and WTO Doc. WT/DS585/1 (India). The US settled its disputes with Canada
and Mexico in July 2019.
188 The characterisation of the US metal tariffs as safeguard measures is highly problematic.
See Yong-Shik Lee, Are Retaliatoy Trade Measures Justified under the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards?, 22(3) J. INT'L ECON. L. 439-458 (2019).
189 Another situation in which a Member may take "retaliatory" measures on its own is the
modification of schedules under GATT art. XXVIII and GATS art. XXI, which provisions
allow a Member adversely affected by another Member's modification of its goods or
services schedule to take equivalent measures against the modifying Member. It should be
noted that in the contexts of schedule modifications or safeguard measures, the
"retaliatory" measures are designed to counter a lawful conduct and their purpose is to
rebalance the level of concessions so as to maintain reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements. See generaly Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in
Context: What is the Goal of Suspending W TO Obigations? in LAw, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 34-72 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn
eds., 2010).
190 For the trajectory of the several trade wars waged by the Trump administration, see
Bown & Kolb, supra note 2.
191 The initial round of the Section 301 tariffs targeted $50 billion worth of Chinese
products. In comparison, the initial target of the US metal tariffs was $48 billion, which
would be borne by multiple countries. For details, see Bown & Kolb, supra note 2.
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scale of trade aggression, the higher the stakes the "victim" country will have in
following the Article 23 discipline because compliance with Article 23 will save its
citizens from the economic woes that would be inflicted by its own retaliatory
trade barriers and from even greater damage that would result from an escalation
of a trade conflict. Politically, unlike in prior times when it was difficult for nations
to resist "misguided councils" of "insidious and crafty" politicians to take trade
revenge,192 the contemporary international discipline of DSU Article 23 lends
legitimacy to governments in rejecting such moves. By simply honouring its treaty
obligation under Article 23, a WTO Member should be able to resist domestic
political pressures to enter into a trade war.
In practice, however, China has followed neither the economic rationale nor the
political logic pertaining to the DSU Article 23 discipline. The next section will
proceed to address this problem.
V. LESSONS FROM THE TRADE WAR: A REFORM PROPOSAL
The US-China trade war has been fought outside the multilateral legal framework
because China, the party to which the multilateral system allocates the burden to
avoid the trade war, failed to comply with DSU Article 23. But how did that
happen? Is there anything the WTO as an institution could have done to prevent
that happening? If not, was it due to certain gaps in the DSU design, or was it
because the system had reached its inherent limits? An inquiry into these questions
may help us to determine whether the multilateral system can be improved in its
function to prevent large-scale trade wars in the future.
A. China's Poi~g Mistake
China made a massive blunder by retaliating against the US tariffs unilaterally. In
addition to all the negative economic and political consequences it has suffered
from the trade war, China's unilateral retaliation has morally damaged its legal case
against the Section 301 tariffs.193 Moreover, by engaging in a trade war outside the
WTO framework, China has unwittingly collaborated with the US in undermining
the multilateral trading system, which is not the result it had hoped for. Being the
192 ADAM SMITH, supra note 146.
193 See US statement opposing China's request for establishing a WTO panel in WTO Doc.
WT/DS543 at the DSB meeting of Dec. 18, 2018 (accusing China of being "hypocritical"
in pursuing its WTO case against the US since it had already retaliated against the US
unilaterally and claiming that China sought to "use the WTO dispute settlement system as a
shield" for its trade-distorting practices not covered by WTO rules). Dispute Settlement
Body, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre Wil/iam Rappard on 18 December 2018, WTO Doc.
WT/DSB/M/423, ¶ 8.3 (Apr. 4, 2019).
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biggest beneficiary of the multilateral trading system, China has been a firm
supporter of the WTO. Contrary to much of the negative publicity about its WTO
compliance, China had been taking care to follow the letter, if not always the spirit,
of WTO law, and has kept a near-perfect record of complying with WTO dispute
settlement rulings.194 The blatant violation of DSU Article 23, therefore, is a major
exception in China's WTO practice.
What caused Beijing to depart from its historically cautious approach to WTO law?
A few factors can be observed. First, the emotional factor. China was outraged by
the release of the Section 301 Report and felt its national dignity was at stake. The
indignation can be readily observed from the emotional statements of China's
representatives at WTO meetings in the early days of the conflict.195 Second, an
inadequate understanding of applicable international law. As already discussed,
China invoked "basic principles of international law" as justification for its
unilateral retaliation but has yet to explain what such principles are and how they
should apply. It appears that China had an inadequate understanding of the
underlying rationale of DSU Article 23 and the interaction between DSU Article
23 and general international law. As a result, China pursued a legally incoherent
strategy-suing the US at the WTO multilateral forum while retaliating against the
US unilaterally without DSB authorisation. Third, a miscalculation of US-China
power relations. Beijing had apparently underestimated the Trump administration's
resolve to reshape US-China economic relations and the level of US bipartisan
194 Since its accession, a total of forty-four WTO cases have been brought against China, of
which eleven remain in consultation, twelve have been settled without adjudication and
twenty-one have resulted in adverse rulings against China. To date, China has never been
subject to DSB-authorised retaliation due to non-compliance. For a detailed treatment of
China's implementation of adverse WTO rulings, see WEIHUAN ZHOU, CHINA'S
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULINGS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2019). For
all WTO disputes involving China, see China and the WTO, supra note 115.
195 See, e.g., Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, supra note 25 (China's
statement at the meeting reads:
WTO Members should jointly prevent the resurrection of Section 301
investigations and lock this beast back into the cage of the WTO rules ... The
character of China was like a bamboo, resilient enough to dance in the wind,
but strong enough to withstand tremendous pressure. Unilateralism was
fundamentally incompatible with the WTO, like fire and water. In the open
sea, if the boat capsized, no one was safe from drowning. Members should not
stay put watching someone wrecking the boat. The WTO was under siege and
all Members should lock arms to defend it.).
See also Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held in Centre William Rappard on 28 May
2018, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/413, ¶¶ 4.7, 4.8 (Aug. 31, 2018) (China's statement at the
DSB meeting on May 28, 2018, condemning the findings of the Section 301 Report as
"turning a deer into a horse", a reference to an ancient Chinese fable that exposes the
arbitrariness of a Chinese emperor).
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support for its China policy. And a long-held notion of economic interdependence
between the two countries may have given the Chinese leaders the false impression
that China had reached a stage of power parity with the US, whereas in reality,
China remained far more reliant on the US than the other way around. 196 It
appears that a combination of the above factors was sufficient to prompt Beijing
onto the wrong path.
B. A Gap in the DSU
In retrospect, could the WTO, as the global institution for trade, have played a role
in preventing China from making its mistake? At the beginning of the trade
conflict, China appealed passionately to the WTO Members for their support in its
condemnation of US aggressive unilateral measures under Section 301. China's
appeal, however, received merely a lukewarm response, with only four members
explicitly endorsing China's position.197 Other than providing the platform for
Members to express their views on the US-China dispute, the WTO took no
institutional action to mediate the dispute or to stop China from breaching its
obligation under DSU Article 23. This state of affairs is unfortunate, but
unsurprising. Known as a "member-driven" organisation, the WTO makes all its
decisions by consensus;198 and unlike other major international organisations,
power in the WTO is not delegated to a board of directors or the organisation's
head.199
196 Panos Mourdoukoutas, A Big Mistake China's Political Elite Makes in Fighting the Trade War,
FORBES (Sept. 7, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2019/09/07/a-big-mistake-chinas-
political-elite-makes-in-fighting-the-trade-war/. See also, Xiangfeng Yang, The Lose-Lose
Trade War, 118 (809) CURRENT HIST. 203 (2019).
197 Of the fourteen Members that spoke out on the issue at the DSB and General Council
meetings in the spring of 2018, only Russia, Pakistan, Venezuela and Bolivia explicitly
criticised the US. While Brazil, India, Tanzania, Cambodia, Cuba, and Hong Kong
expressed their general opposition to unilateralism and called on all parties to adhere to
multilateral disciplines, Japan, EU, Chinese Taipei, and Norway stated that they also shared
the US concerns over China's IP and technology transfer policies. See Dispute Settlement
Body, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 27 March, 2018, WTO Doc.
WT/DSB/M/410, ¶¶ 11.4-11.5 (June 26, 2018); Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of
Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 27Apil 2018, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/412, ¶¶
5.12-5.20 (Aug. 1, 2018); General Council, Minutes of the Meeting held in the Centre William
Rappard on 8 May 2018, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/172, ¶¶ 6.20-6.30 (July 6, 2018).
198 This is despite the various voting provisions in the WTO agreements. For an evolution
of the consensus practice, see G. Marceau & C. Marquet, Practice and Ways of Doing Things in
the World Trade Organization (ITO) Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION: A
LOOK INTO PROCEDURE 513-550 (H.R. Fabri ed., 2019).
199 Understanding the WITO: The Organization, Whose W1TO is it anyway?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/orgle.htm.
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By systemic design, the remedy for violation of DSU Article 23, as in the case of
violation of other WTO rules, is for the affected Member(s) to take the violator to
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.200 In this case, however, the Member
directly affected by China's violation of Article 23 is the US, which chose not to
sue China for the violation.201 As a result, the systemic check on China's unilateral
retaliation broke down.
This scenario reveals a major gap in the DSU design. If a Member takes unilateral
trade measures to tackle an issue not covered by specific WTO rules (i.e.,
aggressive unilateralism), it may breach GATT or other substantive WTO
obligations but will not violate DSU Article 23. But if the victim of aggressive
unilateralism retaliates against the breach of substantive WTO rules unilaterally, it
will violate DSU Article 23. And there is no built-in mechanism to save the victim
from such violation. Without such a mechanism, however, the system cannot
prevent the dispute from escalating into a trade war. This problem will persist as
long as a Member is willing and able to use aggressive unilateralism to tackle issues
beyond the coverage of existing WTO law.202 Since it is practically impossible for
WTO disciplines to cover every emerging issue in international relations, the only
way to ensure DSU Article 23 compliance by the victim of aggressive unilateralism
and thereby to avoid trade wars is to provide an additional enforcement
mechanism for Article 23.
C. A Proposal
What might such an additional enforcement mechanism for DSU Article 23
discipline look like? First, the mechanism must be able to exert multilateral control
over unilateral retaliation, regardless of whether the underlying causes of the
dispute are covered by existing WTO rules. Second, the mechanism needs to be
activated as quickly as possible, before unilateral retaliation can take place. Third,
the mechanism should have some effective means of ensuring compliance with
Article 23. Based on these principles, the mechanism would need two major
200 In theory, nothing in the WTO agreements requires a Member to have a legal interest in
a dispute (i.e., legal standing) to bring a WTO lawsuit. See Appellate Body Report, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc.
WT/DS/AB/R27, ¶ 132 (Sept. 9, 1997). In practice, however, only a Member suffering
injury to its economic interest would have the incentive to bring a WTO dispute.
201 From the US standpoint, the issues addressed by Section 301 tariffs are not covered by
WTO rules. Hence, it will tackle the issues, together with China's responses, outside the
WTO framework.
202 The Uruguay Round negotiators may not have anticipated the resurrection of US-style
aggressive unilateralism. See supra Part IV.E.
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components. One is intervention by the WTO Director-General (DG); the other a
set of consequences in the event the intervention fails.
1. Intervention by the WTO Director-General
As discussed above, when the Section 301 Report was released, China reacted
emotionally and did not appear to have an adequate understanding of the
applicable international law. From the time China made the first statement at the
WTO condemning the Section 301 Report and vowing to "take WTO rules and
other necessag means to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests"203 to the time
China levied the first round of retaliatory tariffs,204 more than three months had
passed. If during that period of time, there had been a mechanism for the DG to
intervene, the outcome may well have been different. With the assistance of highly
competent staff of the WTO Secretariat, such an intervention could have helped
Beijing gain a precise understanding of the applicable law as well as the grave
implications of Article 23 violation. The intervention process would also have
provided a cooling period for emotions. Moreover, a WTO intervention, with its
multilateral legitimacy, would have served as a face-saving device for Beijing
politically.
Functionally, the DG intervention might look like a form of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), similar to "good offices, conciliation and mediation" provided
in Article 5 of the DSU.205 But it is not ADR in nature, but rather an additional
procedure for ensuring compliance with DSU Article 23. The sole purpose of the
intervention would be to dissuade a Member from taking unilateral retaliation in
contravention of Article 23. The process would be initiated by the DG, and a
Member contemplating such unilateral retaliation would be required to participate
in the process. The DG initiation of the process and the mandatory participation
by the Member in question are the two key features designed to overcome the
inability of a "member-driven" institution to respond to the threat of a trade war.
203 Minutes of the Meeting of the Coundilfor Trade in Goods, supra note 25, ¶ 25.4.
204 China announced its decision to levy retaliatory tariffs on April 4, 2018 (see MOFCOM
Announcement No. 34, supra note 28) but did not implement the levy until July 6, 2018, the
same day the US levied its initial round of Section 301 tariffs. For the timeline of the US-
China trade war, see Bown & Kolb, supra note 2.
205 The article 5 procedures have never been used in WTO practice. The only case of
mediation ever conducted by the DG was at the request of the Philippines, Thailand and
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2. Consequences of Intervention Failure
What if the intervention fails and the Member involved ends up taking unilateral
retaliatory measures anyway? Considering the uniquely important function of DSU
Article 23 in the world trading system, a special remedy would be warranted for a
wilful violation of the DSU rule. A "wilful violation" would occur when the
Member required to participate in the intervention failed to follow the advice of
the DG and took unilateral retaliatory action instead. It should be emphasised that
a special remedy would be necessary only in the case of a wilful violation. Other
than in such cases, compliance with DSU Article 23 can be achieved through the
normal WTO dispute settlement procedures.
Under existing WTO law, a Member determined to ignore its obligation under
Article 23 can be relieved of its legal obligations in one of two ways: withdrawal
and waiver. Pursuant to Article XV:1 of the WTO Agreement, any Member may
withdraw from the WTO treaties upon six-month written notice. The withdrawal
will terminate WTO treaty relations between the withdrawing Member and all
other Members; no Member has done so in practice. Alternatively, the Member
may request the Ministerial Conference to waive its obligation under DSU Article
23. Pursuant to Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement, a waiver can only be granted
in exceptional circumstances and for a specific period of time, subject to the terms
and conditions set out in the waiver decision.20 6 In practice, most of the waivers
granted concern tariff schedules; and none concerns obligations under the DSU.207
Given the lack of viable ways to excuse a wilful violation of Article 23 under
existing WTO law, new approaches would be needed to provide special remedies
for such violation. Below are two suggestions modelled after existing WTO
provisions.
a. Forced withdrawal
Unlike the U.N. and certain other international organisations, the WTO does not
entertain the possibility that a Member may be expelled from the organisation for
having persistently violated its principles. 208 Nonetheless, forced withdrawal is
206 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, arts. IX:3-:4 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
207 For the list of waivers granted since the inception of the WTO, see General Council,
Vaivers 1995-2015, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W718 (Jun. 27, 2016); General Council, Waivers-
2017, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/740 (Jan. 12, 2018).
208 A UN member that has persistently violated the UN principles may be expelled from
the organisation by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council. U.N. Charter, art. 6. For a general introduction on the subject, see Louis Sohn,
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legally possible in the context of WTO treaty amendment. Pursuant to paragraphs
3 and 5 of Article X of the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Conference may
decide by a three-fourth majority that any amendment made effective under those
paragraphs "is of such a nature that any Member which has not accepted it within
a period specified by the Ministerial Conference in each case shall be free to
withdraw from the WTO or to remain a Member nith the consent of the Ministeial
Conference" (emphasis added). The alternative provided therein suggests that unless
the Ministerial Conference consents otherwise, a Member that has failed to accept
a certain amendment may be forced to withdraw from the WTO.
A similar approach could be adopted in the case of a wilful violation of DSU
Article 23. The Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourth majority that
the violation of DSU Article 23 by any Member is of such a nature that the
Member shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to remain a Member with the
consent of the Ministerial Conference. Even though forced withdrawal would be
extremely unlikely in practice, prescribing this legal possibility would send a clear
message about the systemic importance of the DSU Article 23 discipline. The
reputation cost associated with forced withdrawal might deter a Member from
committing a wilful violation of Article 23.
b. Suspension of Treaty Relations within the WTO
Alternatively, the special remedy for a wilful violation of Article 23 could be the
suspension of WTO treaty relations between the Member taking unilateral
retaliation (the retaliating Member) and the Member affected by the retaliation (the
affected Member). Unlike the suspension of concessions or other specific
obligations that may be authorised by the DSB under DSU Article 22, the
suspension of treaty relations proposed here would apply to the operation of all
WTO agreements as a whole.
The effect of such suspension would be similar to that of "non-application" under
Article XIII of the WTO Agreement. In accordance with Article XIII "Non-
Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements between Particular Members", the
WTO Agreement and its Annexes 1 and 2 (GATT, GATS, TRIPS and DSU) shall
not apply between any Member and any other Member if either of them does not
consent to such application at the time either becomes a Member. 209 This
mechanism is a continuation of Article XXXV of GATT 1947 "Non-application
Expulsion or Forced Withdrawalfrom an International Organization, 77 HARVARD L. REV. 1381-
1425 (1964).
209 WTO Agreement, supra note 206, art. XIII:1. Since non-application can only be invoked
at the time a country becomes a Member, the invocation cannot be reinstated once
withdrawn.
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of the Agreement between Particular Contracting Parties".210 During the GATT
era, a total of seventy-nine invocations of non-application in respect of twenty-two
countries had been made; while most of which had been subsequently withdrawn,
a few extended into the WTO era. 211 Under the WTO, a total of twelve
invocations of non-application had been made, of which ten had been
subsequently withdrawn and two remained in force.212 Like non-application under
Article XIII, the suspension of WTO treaty relations between the retaliating
Member and the affected Member would apply to the operation of the WTO
Agreement and its Annexes 1 and 2.
Legally, the suspension of WTO treaty relations between the retaliating Member
and the affected Member would relieve both Members from their WTO
obligations owed to each other. Consequently, the two countries could fight a trade
war between themselves without violating WTO rules. Such suspension would be
consistent with VCLT Article 60.2, which provides a party the right to invoke a
material breach of a multilateral treaty as a ground for suspending the operation of
the treaty in whole or in part in its relations with the defaulting State.2 3
One issue is the effect of the suspension on any ongoing WTO litigation between
the two parties. Unlike the case of non-application under Article XIII, where the
two Members concerned would not have had the opportunity to engage in any
WTO dispute with each other since the DSU has not been applied in their
relations, there might be one or more pending WTO disputes between the two
Members in the case of suspension. Logically, the suspension of the operation of
the DSU between the two Members should result in the suspension of all pending
dispute settlement procedures between the two. For the retaliating Member, the
loss of recourse to the DSU procedures vis-a-vis the affected Member would be
part of the cost for a wilful violation of Article 23.
The objective of the proposed special remedies is to discourage wilful violation of
Article 23. Legally, forced withdrawal and suspension of treaty relations would
210 Non-application became necessary because of the two-thirds majority voting on
accession under GATT article XXXIII. See GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, ART. XXXV, at
1037,
https://www.wto.org/english/res e/publications-e/ail 7e/gatt1994_art35_gatt47.pdf.
Accession to the WTO also requires a two-thirds majority voting under article XII of the
WTO Agreement, hence the need for the non-application clause in article XIII.
211 For the list of all invocations during the GATT era, see Id.
212 For a list of invocations (current as of January 2018), see WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX,
GATT 1994 - ARTICLE XIII (JURISPRUDENCE),
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/publicationse/ail 7e/gatt1994_art13_jur.pdf.
213 See supra Part III.C.1. The provision on the suspension of WTO treaties in the case of a
wilful violation would constitute lex specialis to the general law of VCLT article 60.
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have the same effect of protecting the integrity of the WTO legal system, since in
either case the two parties concerned would be completely relieved of their WTO
obligations towards each other. In terms of their impact on the WTO system,
however, suspension of WTO treaty relations would be less drastic than forced
withdrawal. The retaliating Member would maintain its normal WTO relations
with all other Members, and could resume its WTO relations with the retaliating
Member once the wilful violation ceased to exist. Procedurally, suspension could
be effected by written notice from the affected Member to the DSB without the
need for action by the Ministerial Conference, hence would be much easier to
implement than forced withdrawal. On the whole, therefore, suspension of treaty
relations within the WTO would be a preferable form of special remedy.
3. Amendment to DSU Article 23
To implement the above proposal, it would be necessary to add certain provisions
to DSU Article 23. Below is a suggested version of DSU amendment.
"The following text shall be inserted at the end of Article 23 'Strengthening of the
Multilateral System':
3. If it has become reasonably clear that, in seeking the redress of a
violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits
under the covered agreements, a Member may take action in
contravention of the foregoing paragraphs [i.e., Article 23.1 and 23.2],
the Director-General shall initiate an intervention process as soon as
practicable by written notice to the Member in question. Any Member
receiving such written notification shall participate in the intervention
process as directed by the Director-General. The purpose of the
intervention is to dissuade the Member in question from breaching its
obligations under the foregoing paragraphs. The intervention process is
without prejudice to the rights of any Member under the covered
agreements. The intervention process shall become unnecessary if a
dispute has been brought pursuant to the DSU procedures challenging
the action that gives rise to the need for intervention.
4. If a Member fails to participate in the intervention process as
required in paragraph 3, or fails to follow the advice of the Director-
General in the intervention process, and takes action in violation of its
obligations under paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article, such action shall be
deemed to be a wilful violation of the said obligations. In that event,
the Member specially affected by the wilful violation shall be free to
invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the WTO
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2
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thereof in the relations between itself and the Member in violation. The
invocation shall be notified in writing to the DSB. All pending disputes
between the two Members shall be suspended during the suspension of
the operation of the DSU between them. The operation of the said
Agreements shall be resumed between the two Members after the
wilful violation ceases to exist."
In accordance with Article X:8 of the WTO Agreement, the proposed addition to
DSU Article 23 would require approval by the Ministerial Conference, which
decision must be made by consensus; once approved, however, the DSU
amendment would take effect for all WTO Members, without the need for
acceptance by individual Members 214 Presently, various proposals have been made
on the functioning of the appellate review, some of which also contemplate
amendments to the DSU.215 The proposed amendment to Article 23 could be
considered along with those proposals.
It should be emphasised that the proposed mechanism seeks to fill a major gap in
the DSU design revealed by the US-China trade war, i.e., the lack of effective
multilateral control over unilateral retaliation in the event that the Member targeted
by unilateral retaliation is not willing to take the retaliating Member to the WTO
dispute settlement. The proposal aims at providing an additional multilateral
mechanism for the enforcement of DSU Article 23, an existing WTO rule, so as to
prevent escalation of trade disputes into trade wars. The proposal, however, does
not solve the problem of aggressive unilateralism. Conceptually, aggressive
unilateralism today involves the use of trade measures, such as Section 301 tariffs,
to address issues beyond the coverage of existing WTO rules. As such, the
214 In contrast, amendments to other covered agreement require acceptance by individual
Members. See WTO Agreement, supra note 206, arts. X:2-:7.
215 See, e.g., General Council, Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India,
Nonvay, New Zealand, Swtzherland, Australia, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore and Mexico to the
General Coundl, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/752 (Nov. 26, 2018); General Council,
Communication from the European Union, China and India to the General Coundl, WTO Doc.
WT/GC/W/753 (Nov. 26, 2018); CIGISpedal Report, supra note 180; Bruce Hirsh, Resolving
the WTO Appellate Body Crisis: Proposals on Overreach, NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL
(December 2019),
http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Resolving%20the%20WT0 %20Appellate%20
Body%20Crisis_Proposals%20on%200verreach.pdf; Simon Lester, WTO Dispute
Misunderstanding: How to Bridge the Gap between the United States and the Rest of the World, INT'L
ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Apr. 19, 2020), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/04/wto-
dispute-settlement-misunderstandings -how-to-bridge-the-gap-between-the-united-states-
and-the-res.html; See also General Council, Informal Process on Matters Related to the Functioning
of the Appellate Body - Report by the Facilitator H.E. Dr. David Walker (New Zealand), U.N. Doc.
JOB/GC/222 (Oct. 15, 2019) (contemplating a General Council decision to address the
AB crisis under article IX:1 of the WTO Agreement).
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problem can only be dealt with through multilateral negotiations on new
disciplines. Thus, revitalising the WTO negotiating function will be the key to
reining in aggressive unilateralism.216
4. Improving Article 23 Enforcement without DSU Amendment
The above proposal requires DSU amendment because it contemplates additions
to the rights and obligations of WTO Members. But if it is impossible for the
Ministerial Conference to reach a consensus on the amendment, a soft approach
can also be considered. That is, establishing the DG intervention procedure on the
basis of voluntary participation and without the special remedy for a wilful
violation of Article 23.
Given that the goal is to dissuade a Member from taking unilateral retaliation in
violation of Article 23, the proposed mechanism relies heavily on the role of the
DG. The DG/the Secretariat must stay vigilant of the threat of unilateral
retaliation, exercise sound judgement on the initiation of the intervention, and
provide advice and necessary assistance to the Member in question during the
intervention process. Short of DSU amendment, these new powers and
responsibilities of the DG can nonetheless be authorised by the decision of the
Ministerial Conference pursuant to Articles VI:2 and IX:1 of the WTO
Agreement.217 The specific authorisation by the Ministerial Conference would be
necessary as it would demonstrate the systemic importance of ensuring Article 23
compliance and provide the legitimacy to the DG intervention.
Under this soft approach, the participation of a Member in the DG intervention
would be voluntary. While voluntary participation would not ensure participation,
it is quite likely that a Member engrossed in the heat of a trade conflict would
welcome a third-party intervention, especially an intervention authorised by the
Ministerial Conference. Judging from the case of China in the early days of its
trade war with the US, an intervention by the DG might have made all the
difference.
216 For a proposal on comprehensive WTO reform, see Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Why Do We
Need a World Trade Organization For? The Crisis of the Rule-Based Trading System and 1NTO
Reform, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG (June 6, 2020), https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/userupload/MTWTO_Reform_2020_ENG.pdf.
217 Article VI:2 of the WTO Agreement, supra note 206, provides: "The Ministerial
Conference shall appoint the Director-General and adopt regulations setting out the
powers, duties, conditions of service and term of office of the Director-General." Pursuant
to article IX:1 of the WTO Agreement, the decision of the Ministerial Conference shall be
taken by consensus; but if no consensus can be reached, the decision shall be taken by a
majority of the votes cast.
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Finally, a caveat to the above proposal. Recall that DSU Article 23 was born of a
grand bargain made in the Uruguay Round: in exchange for eliminating the power
of individual CONTRACTING PARTIES to block decisions of dispute settlement
panels, the US gave up its power to unilaterally enforce the multilateral trading
rules.218 Currently, as a result of the collapse of the Appellate Body, it again
becomes possible for individual Members to block the decisions of dispute
settlement panels.219 Consequently, unilateral enforcement of existing WTO rules
(as opposed to norms outside the WTO coverage) may also return.220 In that event,
DSU Article 23, and the proposal for its improvement, would be rendered
meaningless. In other words, when binding adjudication of WTO disputes is
forsaken, WTO law will have reached its inherent limit in preventing trade wars.
VI. CONCLUSION
The US-China trade war has been waged outside the WTO legal framework and its
consequences are disastrous. In the midst of a pandemic, the trade war has
expanded to conflict and confrontation in nearly all fronts in the US-China
relations. The precipitous deterioration of US-China relations has pushed the
world to the brink of a new Cold War. While such deterioration may have many
causes, it is the trade conflict that has set the process in motion, and the distrust
and hostility generated thereby has continued to fuel its ferocity.
The US-China trade war was provoked by the US aggressive unilateralism - the
use of trade measures unilaterally in violation of WTO law to address issues not
specifically covered by the WTO agreements. Yet, it is China's tit-for-tat unilateral
retaliation in breach of its obligation under DSU Article 23 that has made the trade
218 See supra Part IV.E.
219 See US Appeal "into the void", supra note 64; the EU proposal, supra note 137.
220 In this regard, the following statement of the USTR is worth noting:
The WTO's dispute settlement system should be totally rethought. The
current two-tier system should be replaced with a single-stage process akin to
commercial arbitration. . . Rather than give the losing party an automatic
appeal to a judicial body, there should be a mechanism that allows the WTO
membership to set aside erroneous panel opinions in exceptional cases.
See Robert E. Lighthizer, How to Set World Trade Straight, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-set-world-trade-straight-11597966341. In
suggesting that the WTO dispute settlement system should resemble commercial
arbitration, which is a binding process, the USTR does not seem to be contemplating a
return to the GATT era, in which individual Members would have the power to block the
adoption of dispute settlement panel decisions and to retaliate unilaterally against violation
of WTO rules.
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war a reality. The DSU, for sound reasons, allocates the burden of avoiding a trade
war to the party that is the "victim" of a WTO violation. As currently formulated,
the DSU is incapable of preventing aggressive unilateralism, which can only be
dealt with through the negotiation of new disciplines. By prohibiting unilateral
retaliation against a WTO violation, however, the DSU may prevent a trade
dispute from escalating into a trade war. The larger the scale of trade involved in
the original WTO violation, the more important it is for the victim of such
violation to comply with DSU Article 23, as avoiding a self-destructing large-scale
trade war is at stake.
In failing to comply with DSU Article 23, China made a huge policy mistake. In
addition to the grave economic and political consequences it has suffered, China's
resort to retaliatory tariffs unilaterally has morally damaged its WTO case against
the US Section 301 tariffs. Moreover, by waging a trade war outside the WTO legal
framework, China has unwittingly collaborated with the US in undermining the
multilateral trading system. It appears that China's policy mistake may have been to
a considerable extent attributable to an inadequate understanding of the applicable
law, that is, the precise scope and the underlying rationale of DSU Article 23 and
the relations between the DSU rule and the principles of general international law
otherwise permitting unilateral retaliation.
The key question, however, is why the WTO has been impotent in forestalling
China from making this policy error. Given the "member-driven" nature of the
WTO, the answer may be found in a certain deficiency in the DSU design.
Currently, unilateral retaliation is prohibited by DSU Article 23. But the
enforcement of Article 23 relies exclusively on the WTO dispute settlement
procedures initiated by individual Members. Thus, when the US, the Member
directly affected by China's retaliatory tariffs, was unwilling to bring China to the
WTO dispute settlement forum over this matter, the system's check on unilateral
retaliation broke down. In short, the current WTO control over unilateral
retaliation is insufficient, as it lacks a built-in mechanism to curb unilateral
retaliation multilaterally.
Based on the insights into the causes of China's policy mistake and of WTO's
inability to prevent such a mistake, this article has proposed an additional enforc-
ement mechanism for DSU Article 23. This mechanism aims at dissuading WTO
Members from wilful violation of Article 23. It would instruct the DG of the
WTO to intervene on a timely basis and provide a special remedy in the event the
intervention fails. The proposal would require an amendment to DSU Article 23.
Alternatively, if adopting such an amendment is impracticable, it is proposed that
the DG intervention process be established on the basis of voluntary participation
and without a special remedy. In that event, the DG intervention should be
specifically authorised by the decision of the Ministerial Conference.
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The reality of the US-China trade war has confirmed Adam Smith's prediction
nearly two and a half centuries ago. Instead of forcing the US to lower its offensive
tariffs, China's retaliation has only begotten more US tariffs and the resulting
hostility has poisoned the entire bilateral relationship. Unlike in the days of Adam
Smith or the GATT era, however, nations today have the benefit of a rule-based
WTO regime that is designed to tame retaliation and convert it "from a weapon of
economic warfare to an instrument of international order."221 But this critical
function of the regime has failed in the US-China trade conflict. While curbing the
US-style aggressive unilateralism will require restoring the negotiating function of
the WTO, ensuring that other countries will not respond to such aggressiveness
unilaterally would go a long way towards prevention of future trade wars. For this
reason, improving multilateral control over unilateral retaliation should be a top
priority in WTO reform.
221 WTO- Peace & StabAiy, supra note 145.
